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The Shape of Things

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THERE HAD BEEN NO FIGHTING OF ANY importance along the western front for two days as we went to press, although a violent artillery duel had provided sensation-hungry newspapers with an excuse for using their big type. The German U-boat campaign had registered its most startling victory by sinking the British aircraft carrier Courageous, with a reported loss of 500 lives, and there was little consolation in the recollection that twenty-five years ago, on September 22, 1914, German submarines sank three British cruisers within a few minutes of each other. On the eastern front the end was in sight. The Polish government had fled. Only an ever-shrinking ring between Kutno and Warsaw still held out against the Nazi invaders. It seemed that the next great battle of the Second World War would be fought not in the field but on the propaganda front. It was momentarily expected that Hitler would publish a "peace offer" designed to make it appear that Britain and France, if they rejected it, would be guilty of senselessly prolonging the war. If the offer should be accepted, which seemed unlikely, "peace" would leave Poland partitioned and Hitler strengthened for new forays and alarums, perhaps in further cooperation with Russia. Moscow reiterated its neutrality toward the rest of Europe while its troops occupied the Polish Ukraine and White Russia. London and Paris were inclined to take the Soviet Union's word at its face value. The volatile stock market seemed to think that the Führer would be successful in obtaining peace, and war stocks were falling. Italy was still on the fence, ready to fall into the arms of the higher bidder. The Rome correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that if Congress maintained the embargo on arms shipments, Italy would be strongly tempted "to take the chance of a possibility of reversal of the European balance with the entire Anglo-French empires as the reward."

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HITLER WILL BE ADDRESSING CONGRESS AS well as Europe if he makes his expected peace bid, and the historic session which opens the day this issue of *The Nation* appears is likely to become a propagandist duel between the President and the Führer. Mr. Roose-

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velt, for all his lapses and his present flirtation with big business, remains democracy's world spokesman, towering above both the Munichers still in power in Western Europe and the Moscow Machiavelli who suddenly found peace as divisible as the Polish plains and marshes. On the eve of the session one can safely say that neither side in the coming Congressional debate desires to see a Nazi victory, though the Bundist fringe is naturally for maintenance of the arms embargo, and the Communist Party—at the pull of Stalin's string—is somersaulting into isolationism. Germany's best strategy would be to let the minority opposed to revision of the Neutrality Act fight out the issue on the basis of American interests, just as it was the Republican Party's best strategy to let opposing factions within the Democratic Party fight out the court issue. The best the Nazis can hope for is delay in lifting the arms embargo. But a cautious waiting game does not fit in with Nazi "dynamism," and the official news service, Dienst aus Deutschland, is already threatening reprisals against the United States if the arms ban is repealed. Threats will strengthen Mr. Roosevelt's hands, and he is still master of the situation. Lindbergh's plea for isolation was compromised by his failure to disavow any sympathy with the Nazi regime, his implication that Hitlerism is no menace to civilization, and the Nazi medal given him last year by Göring. Landon and Knox at their White House conference with the President seemed unlikely to offer strong opposition to Mr. Roosevelt. Senator Borah's much too hasty assumption that "come and get it" sales of arms would necessitate our entry into the war has likewise helped the President. It seems to us that lifting the embargo will help keep Italy off the axis, give Moscow pause, and isolate Germany. That would tend to shorten the war, and the shorter the war the less likely our participation.

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THE ARMISTICE IN THE SOVIET-JAPANESE "vest pocket" war along the Mongolian-Manchurian frontier has upset all calculations in the Far East once again. It was obviously signed in order to free the Soviet troops for action in Poland, but in the absence of information either on the terms of the agreement or the outcome of the fighting which preceded it, the exact significance of the pact is difficult to establish. If it was preceded, as previous Moscow reports indicated, by an overwhelming Soviet military victory and occupation of the disputed territory by Mongolian troops, the pact may be interpreted as part of the Abe government's program for minimizing friction with the foreign powers. But if the Japanese military claims are accurate, the armistice followed a defeat for the Soviet government. There is little evidence that the agreement represents a fundamental shift in either Soviet or Japanese foreign policy. Its terms are almost identical with those which ended the Changkufeng dispute a year ago. Soviet supplies are still pouring into China's Far West, and the Japanese are vehement in denying that the pact will be followed by a general treaty of non-aggression. Even a temporary truce is bound, however, to leave its mark on Far Eastern relationships. The Japanese have already brought pressure on the British for "new defense arrangements" at Shanghai. And after six months of inaction the Japanese army has launched a new drive against Changsha. The Chinese, meanwhile, have not been idle. Reports from Chungking indicate that China's military strength has doubled since the beginning of hostilities two years ago, and that its reserves are fully ample for all emergencies.

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WALL STREET'S ENTHUSIASM OVER THE prospect of war profits has abated somewhat, and both commodities and stocks have lost part of their recent gains. More consideration is now being given both to existing surpluses of goods and to the wide margin of potential production. The government's action in suspending the sugar quotas checked the unjustifiable gamble in that commodity and gave rise to salutary reflections on the extent of available controls. Moreover, Wall Street is, understandably, finding the European situation extremely confusing. Having committed itself to the thesis that war is the medicine for debilitated business, it is apt to be alarmed by any suggestion of peace. Hence the latest Russian moves east and west produced a reaction in prices on the theory that the Western powers might be so discouraged by these developments as to lend an ear to Hitler's "peace" suggestions. Meanwhile, industry has made a definite spurt. Orders are pouring in as a result partly of efforts to build up inventories in anticipation of higher prices and partly of genuine commitments for increased capital expenditures. The railroads, for instance, having long kept renewals at or below the safety limit, are now hastily ordering equipment so as to be able to cope with the expected increase in traffic. The most promising news of the week is that a number of leading industries, including steel, chemicals, rayon, and newsprint, are resisting the temptation to advance prices. This is a wise decision. All these industries stand to increase profits as the result of greater volume. To raise prices now might cause additional scare buying but would probably speedily cheek domestic consumption and lead to a new inventory crisis.

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THE BRITISH MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, headed by Lord MacMillan, a distinguished lawyer, with Lord Perth, former ambassador to Rome, as second in command, has spent its short life in justifiably hot water. Its task is both to supply news and to censor it, but its hastily recruited staff, apparently taking as its motto "no

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news is good news," has concentrated on the latter job to the serious neglect of the former. The British public is complaining bitterly about the black-out of information, and foreign correspondents are being handicapped not only by the difficulty of getting news but by the long delays imposed by unskilled censors. Several big stories have been badly mishandled. In the case of the daring air raid on the German fleet, the first communiqué was so uncommunicative that it suggested total failure. Slowly further details were allowed to be printed, but only after eleven days did the ministry release a thrilling first-hand account by pilots engaged in the action. There seems no reason why this story should not have been given out within twenty-four hours, in which case it would have received far more attention. News that a large British force had been safely ferried over to France was published only after a bureaucratic imbroglio in the course of which the information was released, canceled, and released again. The Minister of Information has now apologized for this performance and promised better coordination between departments and less delay in the censors' office.

*

THERE HAS BEEN ONE GERMAN CASUALTY that will give satisfaction even to people who pity German war victims as well as those of other nations. Gustav Streicher, supreme Nazi master of the pogrom and publisher of the obscene anti-Semitic paper the *Stürmer,* is reported to be in "protective custody" in a sanitarium near Berlin. It is also said that he has been dismissed from all his positions and that his fortune—acquired by means of robberies less well disguised than those of his colleagues—have been confiscated. The alleged reason for Streicher's fall is a quarrel with Göring. But it would be naive to assume that this alleged reason is anything more than an occasion to get rid of a man whose brutal services are not needed just now when Jews are being restored to their jobs and are even allowed to eat at the same table with the Gentile slaves of the Nazi regime. Streicher's disappearance from the public scene may be not only a concession to the needs of war time but also part of the attempted *Gleichschaltung* of Russia and Germany. And there is still another, older reason. At the beginning of the rise of radical nationalism in Germany after the last war Streicher was the vindictive competitor of the less well-known Adolf Hitler, whom he accused of every common crime. Streicher in those days used to adorn his meeting halls with posters reading, "Jews, Dogs, and Followers of Hitler Not Allowed." The two came to agreement; Hitler needed the services of men like Streicher. Since Hitler stepped upon the world scene, he has been purging periodically those who helped him in the petty conquest of Germany. Streicher is probably only the first victim of the newest purge. There are already rumors of the arrest of Goebbels.

What Americans Want

By FREDA KIRCHWEY

WHAT a majority of the American people want is to be as unneutral as possible without getting into war. That is the simple fact, and it should be said clearly. Talk about "legal" neutrality and "real" neutrality only serves to confuse an issue that must be stripped of confusion for the sake of our country's whole future. The present Neutrality Law does not establish neutrality, and an amendment lifting the embargo on shipments of arms and munitions will not turn it into a neutrality law. The embargo must be ended not to make the United States neutral but to enable it to sell to the Western powers the goods which may save them from defeat by Germany. And a desire to save France and Great Britain is not a neutral desire; it is a partisan desire based on a profound and almost desperate belief that the survival of the democratic way of life depends upon the defeat of Hitler.

But the American people don't want to go to war. This great fascist drive is far off. It is directed against France and Great Britain and their empires. It is not our fight—yet—and we want to stay out of it. Not only do we want to save our youth from destruction; we want also to save our political institutions and our economy from the bludgeoning effects of modern conflict. If we go to war we will lay down many liberties as well as many lives; and we want to avoid that sacrifice. The United States is determined to protect its own interests in the face of a struggle for power and survival that is rapidly engulfing whole continents; we will stay out of war unless we become convinced that those interests can only be protected by going in.

On this almost everyone is agreed. No considerable opinion in any party or section of the country would today support the idea of sending an army to Europe. Only one circumstance would weaken this determination: if England and France faced defeat by Germany, the United States would almost certainly decide to go to war. This is not because we cherish any special trust in the British or French government or support the present structures of empire on which their nations rest. It is because their survival is fatally bound up with the hope of freedom on our continent as in the whole world. Even the widespread belief that we should not have fought in 1917 would fail to hold us out if the alternative seemed a sure triumph for Hitler. This seems to me evident in spite of polls and newspaper opinion and the words of statesmen to the contrary.

Isolationists argue that to ship arms to the Western powers when Germany is cut off from such supplies is to invite reprisals and increase the risk of war. To this

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there are two answers. One is that already, under the present law, we are sending them every sort of war supply except guns, explosives, poison gases, and airplanes. The materials we are shipping are considered contraband by every warring nation. To add munitions to the list is to increase the danger by only an insignificant degree. When Senator Borah hurls his rhetorical gas bombs at the proposal to lift the arms embargo he is talking nonsense. If he really wanted to protect us from the perils of trading in war materials, he would demand an embargo on cotton, copper, oil, wheat, steel, machinery—as well as on arms. Neither he nor any of his fellow-diehards is demanding this. Why? Is it because farmers and business men would bitterly oppose such a change?

What does endanger the peace of the United States is the present use of American boats for shipping war supplies. The cash-and-carry provision advocated by the Administration group would eliminate the danger to our peace that lurks in every submarine patrolling the Atlantic. Whether we ship only "secondary" war supplies or arms as well, we should ship them in foreign bottoms, and American ships should stay out of the war zones. Why do the isolationists give such mild support to this proposed addition to the law? Is it because the Administration wants it?

The conflict of interests within the Western nations, their uncertainty and lack of courage, allowed aggression to gain its present terrifying momentum. A stand was made at last only as a counsel of desperation. Throughout the years of democratic retreat the United States played an equivocal and ineffective role. We vaguely cheered on the democracies while refusing to take any positive steps to support or encourage resistance to the fascist drive. Now, when the issue is resolved in war, we can no longer hold back. It is too late to save the peace; we can only use our preponderant power to influence the outcome of the struggle. Even in advance of debate it is plain that in the end American help will be offered to the anti-totalitarian states. But the debate will drag on just the same, and the real issues will be obscured by the language of camouflage employed by both sides.

It no longer matters much that Congressional wrangling encourages Hitler to believe American opinion is divided; that was important only before the war. The harm that will come as the result of delay and a partisan struggle is more concrete. Our chance of staying out of the war depends in great part on the amount of equipment we can ship to Britain and France and the speed with which we can get them there. The more guns we send and the sooner we send them, the better the chance that we shall not have to send men as well. It is this that should be made plain to Congress.

Jobs After Forty

DISHEARTENING evidence of the degree to which men and women—particularly the latter—past the age of forty are handicapped in searching for jobs is presented in a pamphlet published by the Public Affairs Committee. The pamphlet summarizes hitherto unpublished material assembled by the staff of the Department of Labor for the Committee on Employment Problems of Older Workers, and thus contains what is probably the fairest and most complete picture available of the plight of middle-aged workers. It shows that the age at which men are most likely to be employed is the early thirties. From the age of thirty-five the proportion of unemployed begins to rise, at first gradually, then, after forty-five, more steeply. The skilled worker holds his own to forty-five or more, but the unskilled worker begins to feel the handicap of age some ten years earlier. Women, also, are affected earlier. For them the decline in employability sets in at thirty instead of thirty-five, and it increases much more rapidly.

Comparatively few employers admit having a rigid "firing line," or age at which they discharge employees. But a large number of concerns—no fewer than 95 per cent of the large corporations—confess to a more or less rigid hiring age. Even in establishments which have no definite age limit, it is admitted that not many workers over fifty would be hired, and that younger men would ordinarily be given preference. Government agencies, because of civil-service regulations, are often more discriminatory than private employers. The tragedy of these age restrictions is that they catch men at the period in life when their family responsibility is the greatest. Men in their forties are more likely than not to have children in high school or college. And the children cannot quit school and go to work, because jobs are even scarcer for young people in their 'teens than for men in the forties.

This discrimination against men and women in the prime of life is only partially explicable on economic grounds. Employers have advanced four arguments in defense of discriminatory hiring ages: (1) that older workers are less productive than younger employees; (2) that they are more prone to have accidents; (3) that they add to the costs of group insurance; and (4) that they undermine private pension plans. Investigation has shown that none of these arguments is wholly valid. Age is an unreliable standard of efficiency. Some men are more efficient at sixty-five than others at thirty. A study made by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a number of New England plants found "no tendency for output and earnings to diminish materially with age except possibly above sixty." The chances of a worker being involved in an accident decreases rather than increases with age, although older workers tend to be laid

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up longer than younger ones. There is no evidence that the employer's costs of compensation tend to rise with the age of his employees, and the cost of group insurance is increased by only a negligible amount. The cost of private pension plans rises only if the plans are not drawn in line with the best insurance practice.

Far too often the blame for this tragic discrimination against the middle-aged is laid on the machine. But the facts argue strongly against this contention. There are still many types of work in which the experience, dependability, and caution of middle-aged persons is a definite asset. If they are barred from these jobs, the blame rests primarily on the impersonal, rigid hiring policies of large corporations. Unfortunately, this is not the sort of thing that can be remedied by legislative action. It is the kind of problem labor should handle directly through collective bargaining. But first organized labor must be made to see that these discriminatory practices threaten all it has achieved in the past fifty years.

The Mystery of Moscow

THERE is really nothing surprising about the Red Army's invasion of Poland: the desperate condition of that unhappy land and the advance of the Germans toward the eastern frontier provided an opportunity which no opportunist could neglect. Let us pass over the rather sickening explanations that Moscow is merely performing "its sacred duty" by stretching out "a helping hand to its brother Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians." Such apologetics are altogether too reminiscent of the Hitler technique in Austria, the Sudetenland, and Poland itself—a technique which, except in the last instance, was nowhere denounced with more moral fervor than in Moscow. The apparent joy with which the peasants in the eastern provinces greeted the Red Army testifies to the miserable treatment of the poverty-stricken minorities by their Polish overlords, as well as to their desire for peace. But it does not prove Russia's disinterested passion for their liberation. There can be no doubt now that, as *The Nation* suggested last week, an understanding about the partition of Poland accompanied the conclusion of the Russo-German pact.

It may be, of course, that the Soviet government had expected Poland to hold out longer so that it might get its troops across the border before the Germans were uncomfortably close. But we do not expect, as some wishful thinkers in Europe appear to do, that this proximity will lead to clashes. It seems certain that there has been prearrangement of the respective zones of the two armies so that the new border will be fixed without friction. Neither Germany nor Russia can afford to quarrel at this juncture, though in time to come a common frontier may well prove a grief to both.

The chief question which now arises is whether a similar squeeze play has been worked out between Moscow and Berlin for application to Hungary and Rumania. Certainly these two countries will now become more subservient than ever to Hitler's wishes, for both must know that if they risk Nazi displeasure they are liable to be stabbed in the back by the Soviets. Hungary, owing to its seizure of Carpatho-Ukraine from the moribund Czechoslovakia, has within its borders "brothers" who might cry for deliverance, and the Bessarabian province of Rumania might easily be found in need of "protection."

While the Russian march into Poland was clearly to be expected, the rapprochement with Japan is a more startling move. Three weeks ago we understood that one reason Moscow had provided for neutrality in the west was to free its hands for action in the east. Now the wheel has turned full circle, and an armistice is arranged with Japan so that Russia may be untrammeled in Europe. It also leaves the Japanese in a position to intensify their campaign against China by shifting some of their crack divisions which have been maintained in Manchoukuo to cope with Russia. At the same time Tokyo will be able, if it so desires, to renew its pressure on Britain, a development much desired by Hitler, who has worked hard to bring Russians and Japanese together.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the armistice in Manchoukuo can be converted into a more enduring instrument. There are, perhaps, dreams in Berlin of a grand alliance of totalitarian powers which would shatter the "pluto-democracies" forever, but there is no positive evidence that this bright vision is shared by the Kremlin. For while Stalin's coups astonish the world they provide little clue to his final aims. This is the mystery of Moscow today. What does Stalin conceive Russia's role in the new war to be? Is he solely intent on keeping the conflict outside Soviet borders, or is he about to revive the imperialism of the Czars? How far is he prepared to go in assisting the aggrandizement of Nazi Germany? Does he agree with Hitler that if the world is to be made safe for dictatorship, democracy must be crushed? Or is he planning to look on while fascism and democratic capitalism encompass their mutual destruction and pave the way for a Union of Eurasian Soviet Republics?

These are questions which are being asked not only in the outside world but within Russia itself, for if Moscow correspondents are to be believed, Soviet citizens are as much bewildered by the Kremlin kaleidoscope as anyone else. From one hour to the next they do not know whom they may hate with safety. Of course, the answer may be that Stalin has no larger plan than the maintenance of his own power, and if this is so, a succession of twists and turns may be expected.

In the light of this theory it will be interesting to see

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the reaction of Moscow to the Nazi "peace" offensive which, after lagging for a week, seems about to take on new vigor. The armistice in the Far East and the Russian action in Poland are both likely to be used as arguments to persuade the Allies that their situation is hopeless and further fighting futile. There are reports that large numbers of German troops will shortly be transferred from the eastern battlefields to the Italian frontier, there to serve the dual purpose of keeping Mussolini in line and threatening a flank attack on the west through the French Alps. Then it is suggested Britain and France will be asked to accept the *fait accompli* in Poland as a basis for a peace conference which will settle Italian claims against France and German claims for colonies. Were the Allies to accept such proposals Germany would have won the domination of Europe, and Britain and France, hopelessly discredited, could have no further voice in European affairs.

Is Stalin, too, working for a "peace" of this kind? Is he ready to bring still further pressure to bear on the Allies —through Turkey, for instance—in order to help Hitler gain this end? His recent actions suggest that this is his object, and to this extent the claim of the Communists that Russia is "working for peace" is justified. But there is no evidence that Britain and France are prepared to swallow their announced aim of making an end of Hitler and accept instead terms that would rivet his chains on Europe.

Russia Goes West

BY LOUIS FISCHER

Paris, September 18 (by radio)

WHO will now be foolish enough to continue to defend the Russo-German "non-aggression" pact? On March 10 Stalin promised that he would support states fighting for their independence. He has broken that promise. On August 31 Molotov declared, "We have a non-aggression pact with Poland." Today he says there is no Poland. Hitler said that about Czechoslovakia, but Russia's attitude then was different. Even after Hitler's seizure of Bohemia and Moravia the Soviet government continued to grant diplomatic privileges to the Czech minister in Moscow, Dr. Fierlinger. These were withdrawn several days after the pact with Germany was signed. That pact is even worse than it seemed at first. Everybody suspected that it was concluded at the expense of Poland. But China will also suffer. Nothing remains of the traditional Soviet policy. Why Stalin should want Polish marshes I cannot understand. Lenin cheerfully offered them to Poland in 1921. Stalin may think that what czarist Russia lost in the first World War he will restore in the second. But the Czar also lost his head.

After Russia's unkind kick at its bleeding body, Poland naturally will be crushed. But how much is Hitler's position improved thereby? Hitler will be forced to keep a large garrison to watch the Poles; he will need a big force to guard the Russian frontier lest the Red Army moves too far west. Moreover, he may soon have reason to invade Rumania. Germany's eastern front remains.

Russia cannot play a role on the western front. Russian troops could not reach it except through Germany, and I don't suppose Hitler would let them in unless he were on his last legs. Moscow will therefore be tempted to operate in the Baltic and the Balkans. This may provoke friction between Russia and Germany.

The determination of England and France remains unchanged by Russia's military move. Bonnet was removed from the Foreign Office because his presence there was incongruous rather than dangerous. Appeasement and war don't mix. There are three obstacles to any policy other than the resolute prosecution of war: the French army, the French people, and the British government. Daladier's tentative Cabinet reorganization brought in no giants and left none out. Clemenceaus are rare, but that does not matter yet. The army commands.

I find that the Allies' conduct of the war thus far has had the touch of genius. Dilettantes expected France to attack violently on the west, but the French general staff exercised a restraint unusual to the military mind. Anglo-French strategy consists in obtaining an economic strangle-hold on Germany by means of a blockade and a cautious coming to grips with the Reichswehr on German soil. The longer decisive combat is postponed, the better prepared will be the Allies, whose rearmament started late, and the worse off Germany will be for want of vital imports. Moreover, no country manufactures as many airplanes as are lost in intensive fighting, and both sides have therefore been anxious to save their machines for the time when the battle waxes hot. Whichever nation starts bombing enemy cities will invite destruction of its own. The German air force has not attempted to interfere with French and British mobilization or the meticulously planned transport of the first large British contingents to France. These essential operations might have been hampered if Allied aircraft had dropped more

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than "confetti" and thus diverted Nazi machines from Poland. The Poles of course suffered, but Gamelin and Gort have discounted Polish resistance from the beginning, and in a letter Chamberlain sent Hitler on August 21 he warned the Führer that Poland's defeat would not shorten the war.

The French and British have got off to a flying start in organization. The ocean-convoy system introduced in the summer of 1917 is already functioning; conscription came in the summer of 1916, but it antedated present hostilities; the Allied Supreme War Council was set up in 1917 after endless friction and waste, but the council's first meeting in this war was held last week. The British military contribution on the Continent will be larger than in 1914. The French rejoice in not having war on their territory.

Nations and armies fight on their stomachs as of yore, but in addition modern motorized warfare lives on factories, and factories have gigantic maws which demand endless quantities of raw materials. This war is above all an economic struggle. The British announcement that the war will probably last three years was an inspiration; it frightened the Nazis, still dreaming of a one-front lightning war in Poland. The blockade is irritating them after only a fortnight. The German merchant marine has been swept off the seas, and while submarines can sink ships, they cannot carry freight. The Allied navies are also stopping the neutrals from provisioning Germany. Germany has little money. Russia and Yugoslavia have announced they will deliver only for cash. Italy is sending heavy supply trains directly and through Switzerland. Germany has been paying Italy with Saar coal, but the French advance is interfering with Saar coal mining. Italy is too impoverished to grant credits.

In 1938, according to official Reich statistics, the average meat consumption per person per week was 1,970 grams. The compulsory rationing system instituted on August 28 lowered this to 700 grams, and before a fortnight of war had elapsed, it was officially reduced to 500 grams, including bones. The food ration in general is 30 per cent under the peace-time norm, which was low enough. Industrial plants are on a similar starvation diet of raw materials. The blockade now complements the ravages of Hitler economics. The British dictatorship on the sea has struck a serious blow at Hitler's dictatorship of Germany.

Poland cannot supply the deficit of commodities. Churned up by cruel invasion, seething with national resentment and guerrilla warfare, this poor country, whose living standards were always miserable, is less likely than ever to furnish large surpluses. If Polish industries could not supply the Polish army with adequate equipment, they cannot be much of an asset even under more expert German management, with sullen Polish labor. Germany therefore will hardly be able to resist the temptation or avoid the necessity of occupying Rumania. That would put Hungary in peril. Hungary has not yet announced its neutrality. Csaky says it is unnecessary. He may look forward to taking a bite of Rumania. He should beware of the fate of Beck, who took a bite of Czechoslovakia.

Nor can Russia fill all Germany's needs. Petroleum and manganese are bulky and are mined in the distant Caucasus. The Soviet railways could carry only negligible quantities. The normal route of the Mediterranean is closed by His Majesty's navy. The Danube is not very navigable. Rail transportation through Rumania is scarcely feasible before another year, if then, owing to the shortage of rolling stock in Rumania and Germany. Germany can get Russian timber, flax, woodpulp, grain, and arms if Stalin has any to spare and if his charity goes to the extent of making gifts to the Nazis. Should this be the case, or should Russia accept German economic tutelage, the world will witness a titanic struggle between two locked-in powers and two sea powers. Many essential metals and materials are available only overseas.

The Allies are the stronger, financially and industrially. They will get aid from the colonies and dominions, and they hope from America. I do not think France and England want or require active United States military participation. The chief problem of this war is materials, not men. The Allies can continue the war alone for years; indeed they intimate we might embarrass them in peace if we joined them in war. All they ask is goods sold for immediate cash (France has two tons more gold than in 1914) and carried in their own ships. That is the least America can do and all it need ever do. This ought to remove the primary objection to raising the embargo —that commercial sales would drag us into the firing line.

The neutrals in Europe, on the other hand, are a nuisance. Some obstruct military operations. Armed millions in Italy are unemployed while the French and British staffs yearn for a second battlefield in Germany. The Allies are ready to pave the road to it with gold before it is covered with snow. The Italians are ready to accept gold but are bargaining for deserts, mountains, and black tribes. Does this reflect an honorable intention to repeat the 1915 betrayal or procrastination until the date fixed for belligerency? The Allies will want to know very soon. The answer will affect the war roles of Yugoslavia, Spain, and Turkey. Turkey is also looking toward Moscow. The longer the war, the fewer the neutrals. The stronger the Allies, the shorter the war.

Meanwhile the practice the Germans had at Guernica and elsewhere in Spain makes them perfect in Poland. Hitler promised not to make war on women and children; he promised not to make war on Poland; he also promised not to take the Czechs. His last promises were given to Stalin.

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Washington in a Squirrel Cage

BY KENNETH G. CRAWFORD

Washington, September 18

BARRING sudden outbreak of peace in Europe—a remote possibility with the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis piling up successes—President Roosevelt seems certain of winning his fight for repeal of the arms embargo at the special session of Congress. Every incredible instalment in the story of double and triple cross that comes out of the belligerent capitals plays into his hands. So far as American public opinion is concerned, all the world's cutthroats are now in one mob, and any move by the Administration to help the international posse trying to bring them to book is certain of popular support. Such a move is the President's proposal to lift the prohibition against the sale of arms, ammunition, and implements of war to belligerents.

Senator Borah

The elaborate rationalization by which the emerging Roosevelt policy is justified in the name of neutrality appears unnecessary even now and probably will be dropped later. At the moment there is a considerable body of public opinion against "getting into the European mess." But it will almost certainly diminish now that the yellow peril has joined Hitlerism and communism in the fearsome triumvirate opposed by the democracies.

Leaders of the misnamed isolationist bloc in the Senate have pressed too far into territory they are not prepared to defend. Borah, Bone, Nye, neutrals from the Northwest, can afford to fight it out where they are, perhaps. Their constituencies are strongly isolationist. Not so Vandenberg, Johnson, and Clark, who are too far committed to retreat. Vandenberg's Presidential prospects are likely to be buried in the ruins of unfortified cities. Johnson may be able to wriggle out of his predicament by playing up to California's feeling against Japan. He can point out that the policy which helps the Allies will hurt China. He also can balance his isolationism with his shouts for a bigger navy. Clark has no out, and his political future is probably behind him.

The lost battalion of neutrals will not only be raked by the frontal fire of European news and propaganda as the session progresses, but will be pounded from behind by the war-born prosperity at home. Even the Northwestern nucleus will feel the pressure of rising farm prices. No member of the House or Senate will be immune from the agitation of the property lobby for a policy that gives every branch of business and industry a chance to take full advantage of war-trade possibilities. The President obviously has decided to make his peace with business in the interest of national unity, and the bitterest of his old enemies will now be his most enthusiastic allies. He has, to be sure, warned against profiteering and, in the case of sugar, actually done something to frustrate the crude plot which doubled retail prices almost overnight. But in general he is encouraging war profits and rising commodity prices. His attempt to limit the special session to the narrow issue of the arms embargo makes it plain that he has no intention of swimming upstream against the forces let loose by an inflationary war economy.

If he succeeds in forcing such a limitation, as apparently he will, the battle of the special session will be no more than a sham battle for a symbolic rather than a material objective. If Americans are to be permitted to sell the Allies wheat, cotton, copper, chemicals, and steel, it is relatively unimportant whether they also sell guns and explosives. Yet Borah, in his disappointing radio speech, defined the issue as arms embargo and nothing else. He had previously talked of insisting upon consideration of such questions as profiteering. In his speech he airily dismissed even cash-and-carry as a side issue. But if Congress wishes to prevent American involvement in the war, cash-and-carry is more necessary than an arms embargo. If American ships are torpedoed, it will make slight difference whether they are carrying finished guns or steel. Where American ships are permitted to go is infinitely more important in the development of a peace policy than what they may carry.

Borah's position is by no means an isolationist one. Neither, it can be assumed from their statements, is that of most of his colleagues. They are unwilling to face the implications of their own policy. If we are to put an embargo on arms and ammunition, why not on everything else? Or, at least, why not limit trade in other commodities to peace-time quotas? But such a program would be opposed by farmers, eager to dispose of their surpluses at a good price, as well as business men, who

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look forward to a boom of major proportions. If it is unneutral to sell munitions to only one side, which it is, why isn't it just as unneutral and dangerous to sell other supplies? To give an honest answer to these questions the Borah bloc would have to propose a far-reaching program of social and economic adjustment at home—heavy government spending to prime the home market, heavier taxation to pay the bill, and a period of rough going while that program was developed. Most of the neutrals—La Follette and a few others excepted—won't do this. Unless they do, they will deserve defeat.

The easy out proposed by some isolationists, the out given a nod by the Administration in calling the Panama City conference—increased trade with the Americas to compensate for loss of European markets—is not good enough. South and Central American countries can pay for American manufactures only with agricultural raw materials and some metals. Except for coffee and bananas, most of these commodities are competitive, and American farmers will yowl if they are imported in quantity. Moreover, development of South American markets calls for big credits, and the very isolationists who talk loudest about pan-Americanism oppose such credit extensions.

The trend in Washington is like nothing so much as the gyrations of a squirrel in a revolving cage. Roosevelt's sincerity when he says his primary objective is to keep the United States out of war is unquestionable. But his policy is almost precisely Wilson's with the tempo accelerated. The Allies are to be sold everything we can sell them. Presently there will be a demand to implement the trade with credits. Temporary domestic prosperity results. There is talk at the White House of turning off the brain trust, fountainhead of liberal thought; the big men of business file in and out of the President's study, now decorated with war maps; according to Secretary Early there will be no censorship of press and radio "yet"; the President himself talks about hunting down radicals; Attorney General Murphy appeals to citizens to spy on their neighbors. Take 1914, 1915, and 1916 calendars, tear a month off every hour, and you have Washington in 1939.

Chamberlain's Russo-German Pact

BY I. F. STONE

I

A GLANCE back over the newspaper reports and news of the past two years may help to clarify current discussion of the Russo-German non-aggression consultation pact. One way to judge the pact is to recall the cries of "canard" that rose from the pro-Soviet press when the first hints began to appear that an agreement of this kind was a possibility. The Communists were not alone in rejecting these reports. All of us who felt that the Soviet Union was the core of the world front against fascism shared their indignation and contemptuous disbelief. If a non-aggression pact were indeed a way to "stiffen the democracies" and "prevent a Munich"—I quote some of the apologists-after-the-fact—it is odd that no anti-fascist met these early speculations by asking whether a Russo-German agreement might not be a feasible and clever maneuver. On the contrary the idea was dismissed as either the propaganda of reactionaries or the wishful thinking of oppositionists who felt—as we all did—that a pact of this kind would discredit the Soviet Union. All this may seem elementary. It is already being forgotten.

I have been able to find three stories by foreign correspondents during the year 1938 which speculated on the possibility of some kind of rapprochement between the U. S. S. R. and Nazi Germany. On May 28 William Bird cabled the New York *Sun* from Paris that too little attention had been paid to the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. He said the return of von Schulenburg to the German embassy at Moscow and the nomination of A. T. Merekalov as ambassador to Berlin "cannot be regarded as simple routine. There is no doubt that Russo-German relations have taken a new turning. . . ." Bird felt that "the important thing for Germany is to get access to the wheat fields of the Ukraine; the important thing for Stalin is to have the German machine-shop at his disposal when war comes in the East. It is no accident that a specialist in steel is the new Soviet ambassador to Berlin." This dispatch was discounted on the ground that the *Sun* is anti-Soviet. Similar reasons made it easy to brush aside a cable sent by H. R. Knickerbocker from Prague on June 18, 1938, to the Hearst-owned International News Service. Knickerbocker said there was a report that von Schulenburg was trying to negotiate a pact with Stalin. He wrote that "on the surface" this was to be a new pact of non-aggression, but a non-aggression pact of such a nature as to cancel the Franco-Soviet pact. The agreement since signed exactly fits that description. Knickerbocker went on to say that both countries denied this report and that the Czechs regarded it as an attempt to frighten England into giving Germany a free hand

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with Czechoslovakia. "One odd feature of the projected plan in its present version," Knickerbocker declared, "is that Hitler is said to have laid down two conditions. First, that Maxim Litvinov must resign as Soviet Foreign Commissar; second, that Gregori Dimitrov, of Reichstag-fire-trial fame, be removed from the chairmanship of the Communist International." Knickerbocker seemed skeptical of his own story. "Acceptance by Stalin of the plan itself, much less its conditions, is believed in authoritative circles to be absolutely excluded."

The next hint came not from a Hearst correspondent but from Walter Duranty, who had come to be regarded as an unofficial spokesman for the Kremlin. In a cable from Paris to the New York *Times* on October 10, 1938, he said, "There remains a possibility—I do not say probability—which makes the present leaders of France and England sleep uneasily at nights, namely, a Russo-German rapprochement, cooperation instead of war." Duranty declared that when one got down to "brass tacks" the only obstacle to the policy of Russo-German collaboration Bismarck had always advocated was "Hitler's fanatic fury against what he calls 'Judeo-Bolshevism.'" There followed a sentence that was cynical and shocking: "But Hitler is not immortal and dictators can change their minds and Stalin has shot more Jews in two years of purge than were ever killed in Germany." Duranty said that should Hitler decline to imitate Napoleon and prefer the iron and coal of Alsace-Lorraine to the "distant riches" of the Donetz basin, "there is no reason to believe that Russia would refuse collaboration with Germany or shed tears over the ultimate fate of France and the British Empire." Was this a wink from Moscow to Berlin? Or was Duranty off on some queer tangent of his own? At the time the latter alone seemed a plausible explanation. Any unpleasant taste was removed a month later by Dimitrov's speech on the twenty-first anniversary of the revolution. Dimitrov did, indeed, warn against "the policy of warlike agreement between the fascist aggressors and England and France," but made no suggestion of rapprochement with Germany as a way out. "Nothing can be accomplished," he cried, "with mere pacific declarations [non-aggression pacts?]. Active opposition against armed fascism is necessary to show the mailed fist of the people."

But the "canards" did not end. The first of the current year came on January 19. On that day the New York *Daily News* ran a copyright cable dated from London but declaring that "in Berlin tonight" economic and military collaboration between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany "was envisaged." The *News* is a tabloid. Tabloids are sensational. The owner of the *News* is anti-Soviet. Union Square read and chuckled. The *News* said the first step would be taken the following week at a conference between German and Russian representatives either in Stockholm or Copenhagen. It declared the new move had been initiated by the Führer himself when he "astounded diplomats at his New Year's reception" by singling out the Soviet ambassador for a prolonged private conversation. Hitler had asked an exchange of views, given assurances on the Ukraine. Stalin had consented. "Maxim Litvinov's failure to attend the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva, it was learned, was due to his opposition to the Hitler proposal. Stalin, it was said, ordered his chief foreign adviser of years past to remain, literally a prisoner, in Moscow." Germany, the *News* said, was ready to abandon its tie with Tokyo; Russia, "deserted during the September crisis by Great Britain and France," was ready "to cement new alliances." This cable, with its "it is learned's" and "it is said's" seemed a typical example of what is known on a newspaper as "a dope story."

Soon there came hints from Moscow itself. On January 31 *Pravda* quoted without comment the London *News-Chronicle's* warning that it would be "extremely unwise to suppose that the existing disaccord between Moscow and Berlin will necessarily remain an unchangeable factor of international policy"; and the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow noted, "The fact that *Pravda* failed to reject indignantly the suggestion of a possible Soviet-German rapprochement increased its significance to foreign observers." On March 11 in his speech before the eighteenth All-Union Congress in Moscow, Stalin accused enemies of Russia of trying to foment war between the Soviet Union and Germany, and the Associated Press correspondent in Moscow voiced what many felt—that "in its emphasis upon a lack of any genuine basis for war between Germany and Russia, his speech sounded almost like a rapprochement between these two countries." To that correspondent the speech seemed "strikingly reminiscent" of Stalin's speech in 1934 before the seventeenth All-Union Congress, the year before the adoption of the Popular Front line. At that time Stalin said the real issue in so far as Russo-German relations were concerned was not the new fascist regime. "Naturally we are far from enthusiastic about that," he said, but Russia had enjoyed good relations with Italy despite fascism. The real issue, he declared, was the struggle within the Reich "between advocates of cooperation with Soviet Russia and opponents of that policy." Note that he said "cooperation" and not merely good relations. It is, in fact, "cooperation" with the U. S. S. R. that one wing of the Nazi Party, of the Reichswehr, and of German industry has always wanted.

II

Stalin's speech was made on March 11. German troops occupied Prague on March 15. March 15 was the Continental Divide of British policy. From that day on "appeasement" became overwhelmingly unpopular, and the demand in Britain for a Russian alliance rose in volume until it included even the London *Times*, the

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Cliveden set, and the formerly pro-Nazi *Observer*. I think two conclusions are possible on the basis of what we now know, though we are far from knowing all that occurred. The first conclusion is that by March, 1938, the idea of a Russo-German agreement was not absolutely excluded by the Soviet Union, and by agreement I mean a non-aggression pact, even a non-aggression pact which would prevent the U. S. S. R. from entering the peace front against fascism that it had so long sought to erect. The second is that London needed no corps of spies in Berlin and Moscow to inform it that a Russo-German rapprochement of some kind was a possibility. On the contrary, if so much had appeared in the press, it is safe to assume that at least a little more was known to the British Intelligence Service and therefore to Chamberlain. If Chamberlain had shared the popular revulsion in Britain against Munichism, these scattered hints alone would have been sufficient to make him hasten negotiation of a pact with the Soviets.

But if one goes back day by day over the news reports, one finds strong reasons to suspect that Chamberlain, although he finally bowed before popular pressure, did not share the general reaction after Hitler took Bohemia and Moravia. Although the London *Times* called the invasion "a crude, brutal act of oppression and suppression" and there were bitter questions in the Commons on March 15, Chamberlain's statement that day could hardly be described as fiery. "I have so often heard charges of a breach of faith bandied about," he said, "which do not seem to me to be founded on sufficient premises. I do not wish to associate myself today with any charges of that character, but I am bound to say that I cannot believe anything of the kind that has taken place was contemplated by any of the signatories of the Munich agreement. . . . But, finally, do not let us be deflected from our course." What did he mean by "our course"? "It was clear," Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., wrote in his dispatch to the New York *Times,* "that he intended to pursue his policy of 'appeasement' whether Germany gave him any encouragement or not." On March 16 in the Commons Chamberlain was asked to tell the Führer that British indignation would be intensified if there were any attack "on the lives or liberties of leaders of the Czech people." He replied, "I think it would be wrong to assume that the German government has any such intention." When Lady Astor leaped to her feet and asked the Prime Minister to let the German government "know with what horror the whole of this country regards Germany's action," Chamberlain showed himself many degrees cooler than Cliveden. He made no reply. It was not until March 17 that the Prime Minister recalled Sir Nevile Henderson from Berlin "to report" and made the famous speech in Birmingham in which he protested that Germany had extinguished the liberties of a "proud, brave people" and asked, "If it is so easy to discover good reasons for ignoring assurances so solidly and repeatedly given, what reliance can be placed upon other assurances which come from the same place?" Chamberlain was referring, of course, to Hitler's assurances, not to his own.

In itself this emotional lag on the part of Chamberlain might not be sufficient to support the conclusion that he still favored "appeasement." Mr. Chamberlain's nature shows little tendency toward the passionate. There are other indications that "appeasement" had not been abandoned. The day the German troops marched into Prague the Federation of British Industries announced that its delegates at Düsseldorf had concluded an agreement with its Nazi counterpart, the Reichsgruppe Industrie, for joint exploitation of export markets. The news provoked protest, but not until four days later did Halifax announce that the government approval necessary to make the agreement binding "had to be and must be indefinitely postponed." Postponed, not abandoned. Two days afterward Chamberlain dropped a hint to the Reich that the postponement might not be too extended. He told the Commons, "There is no desire on the part of His Majesty's Government to stand in the way of any reasonable efforts on the part of Germany to expand her export trade. On the contrary, we were on the point of discussing in the most friendly way the possibility of trade agreements which would have benefited both countries when the events took place which, *for the time being at any rate,* put a stop to these discussions." The italics are mine. Nor were indications of a desire to "appease" absent in the hectic months which followed. In May, after Chamberlain had called the story a "mare's nest," the Commons learned that the Bank of England had indeed handed over five million pounds in Czech gold to the Reichsbank. In July the government first denied and then admitted that Robert S. Hudson, head of the Board of Trade, had tried to "appease" Germany with a billion-pound loan, and Hudson escaped with the mildest of rebukes. Chamberlain's long delay in making clear that Danzig was included in his pledge to Poland must be regarded as significant: the pledge to Poland was made on March 31; Danzig was not specifically mentioned until July 10. The long haggle over the five-million-pound cash loan the Poles needed to buy rifles was hardly calculated to stiffen Polish resistance; the loan never was granted. Sir John Simon was "standing firm" against the five-million-pound loan to Britain's ally, Poland, at the very time that Hudson was discussing a billion-pound loan to Britain's enemy, Germany.*

* It is an indication of how far we may trust a government headed by Chamberlain that the Federation of British Industries agreement would have hit American export trade; that the billion-pound loan to Germany would have required the cooperation of the American money market; but that one reason for denying Poland a cash loan was that "the British were afraid that it would go to the United States and have a weakening effect on the pound." (Robert P. Post dispatch from London, New York *Times,* July 27.)

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Chamberlain's desire for further "appeasement" is shown, above all, in the interminable delay in negotiating a Soviet pact. For as the opponents of his policies stressed over and over again in the Commons, the pledge to Poland was worth little without Russian aid. The corollary, openly put forward in Berlin, was that without Russian aid Poland would be unable to resist and would be forced to surrender Danzig and the "corridor across the Corridor." The conclusion, after reexamination of the day-by-day record, seems to me inescapable that Chamberlain did not want a Russian pact, and that he did not want it, among other reasons, because he hoped the failure to obtain the pact would lead the Poles to surrender. I believe that certainly until the fall of Litvinov and probably for many weeks afterward the British could have had a Russian pact if they had wanted one, even though I also believe that the Kremlin was at the same time prepared to come to an agreement with Germany as an alternative.

The sequence of events before the resignation of Litvinov is instructive. The Russian proposal on March 20 for a nine-power conference against German aggression was countered by a British suggestion for a three-power declaration, but one which would be a warning rather than a pledge to fight. Negotiations dragged on from that point. On April 23 Chamberlain suddenly sent Henderson back to Berlin. On May Day, while Communists marched in London with flaming banners proclaiming "Britain and Russia—the Hope of the World," the New York *Times* ran a dispatch from Berlin, "Another 'Little' War Believed German Aim. Victory over Poland Without a Break with Great Britain Would Meet Hopes of the Nazi Regime." On May 3 the British Cabinet decided to reject the Russian offer of an alliance, and Chamberlain told the Commons he was ready to exchange non-aggression pledges with Germany. On May 4 Litvinov resigned. On May 8 Otto D. Tolischus reported from Berlin (I quote the headlines in the New York *Times* the next day), "Deal with Stalin Sought by Hitler. Reich Would Neutralize Soviet by Non-Aggression Treaty and Then Move on Poland." Tolischus wrote, "To facilitate the desired development the German government has issued orders to the press not to attack Russia and to go lightly even in the 'holy crusade' against Bolshevism."

I cannot at this time review in detail the tangled events that followed. It is sufficient to note that while the German press, and to a certain extent the Italian, set out to woo the Russians and to pave the way for an agreement, and while British opinion grew more and more restive at delay in obtaining a pact, Chamberlain pursued a policy certain to offend and exasperate Moscow: the vacation ostentatiously spent by Chamberlain with the anti-Soviet pro-Japanese retired diplomat, Sir Francis Lindley, at a crucial moment in the negotiations; the dispatch of an underling instead of Halifax to Moscow; the stories continually emanating from London of fear that a Russian pact might drive Mussolini closer to the axis, that it might antagonize the Japanese, and that it might offend the Vatican, Spain, Portugal, and "certain South American countries"—all this while the German press spoke more and more openly of its hope for an agreement with Russia. I think there is but one explanation for the Prime Minister's conduct, and the clue is provided, I believe, by a dispatch which Guido Enderis sent to the New York *Times* from Berlin under date of July 21.

Enderis said the Nazis still expected the peaceful and unconditional return of Danzig. Either the British would force the Poles to surrender as they had the Czechs or, Enderis wrote, "the other alternative in the unofficial German view is based on the conviction that Britain, failing to conclude a pact with the Soviets, would be in an even stronger and less prejudicial position to intervene in the Danzig crisis. Freed of automatic entanglements by a tri-power pact, Britain, so runs the private German thesis, would with greater freedom proceed to convince Poland of the futility of her stand on Danzig by warning Warsaw that it was confronted with the specter of Russo-German rapprochement, or, at any rate, with a neutral or negative military factor in Russia, leaving her at the sole mercy of a powerfully armed opponent in Germany. Such a development, it is believed here, would considerably enhance Britain's prospect of influencing Warsaw. . . ." The night Tolischus wrote that dispatch the Moscow radio announced that trade negotiations were under way between Germany and the Soviet Union. It is my belief that Chamberlain knew a Russo-German agreement was a possibility and did all he could to further it in the hope that it would make for a new Munich or "a little war" between Germany and Poland. I think that this also provides the clue to his delay in declaring war and in prosecuting it.

III

Under date of September 11 G. E. R. Gedye cabled the New York *Times* from Moscow that the Russians were worried over the German advance. "Originally," he said, "they believed that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact would make impossible Franco-British backing for Poland and that the Poles would be compelled to surrender Danzig and the Corridor and war would be postponed indefinitely." There I believe is the true reason why Moscow signed the pact, for this was the only reasonable estimate of what would happen if Poland were deprived of Russian help. London surrendered Czechoslovakia in the hope of pushing Hitler east; Moscow handed Danzig and the Corridor to Hitler in the hope that he would go West. I think that Stalin will be as rudely surprised as was Chamberlain *unless Moscow is prepared to ally itself with Berlin.*

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Will the Blockade Succeed?

BY FRITZ STERNBERG

TWO factors gave the victory to the Allies in the World War of 1914-18: superiority in raw materials, weapons, and ammunition; and a food supply adequate in quantity and quality for both the army and the civilian population at a time when there was hunger in Germany. The blockade, which grew more effective year by year, was finally decisive. This was recognized in Germany immediately after the war, but many years later the reactionary groups and still later the National Socialist opposition gained support with the catchword that the military defeat was the result not of the superiority of the Allies in material, men, and food but of the "stab in the back," the Socialist agitation against the war which disrupted the morale of the fighting troops.

The German army tolerated this legend of the stab in the back, and even encouraged it, as long as National Socialism was in opposition, because it gave support to the Nazi plans for rearmament and the new militarization of the German people. After Hitler had come to power, however, and rearmament had been achieved at forced tempo, the army began to see the danger in the legend of the stab in the back. This legend threatened to deceive the nation as to the real reasons for the final defeat; and at a time when preparations for a new war were going forward in every field, the luxury of self-deception was not permissible. This is the background of an article by Lieutenant General A. D. Marx which recently appeared in the *Militär Wochenblatt* under the title The Reason of All Reasons. "Every Thursday evening," the author wrote, "I read the *Militär Wochenblatt* with enjoyment, but seldom have I been so delighted as when I read the article, Food Supply for the Troops in War, by Captain Lenz, in Number 43. Here at last the answer to the question why our offensive was repulsed in 1918 is made absolutely clear—our hungry troops could not be forced beyond the captured food depots." He continued:

> Whoever has not had this experience himself is inclined to underestimate the influence of the food supply; he is not likely to understand and therefore excuse the breakdown of morale. But even greater, in my opinion, is the danger that we shall continue to underestimate this influence, that we shall pass over such considerations with a *Nichevo,* and go on saying that it was not hunger that defeated us, not the lack of food, but merely the lack of the right slogan, the right propaganda. If we should ever again have to fight under similar conditions against an enemy with six times as much artillery ammunition and twice as much capacity to relieve his troops, against soldiers living in a fairyland as far as food and equipment were concerned (we lived on moldy bread, turnips, and dried vegetables in the last years), and if our youth should not only keep on for four years but should continue to fight and win victories in spite of the fact that a new great power with millions of fresh soldiers appeared in the fourth year, then but only then would I say that General von Metzsch is right in maintaining that we were beaten in 1914-18 by the wrong spirit and not by the failure of the food supply.

General Marx is saying that the youth should be told: "The generation of 1914-18 achieved tremendous things, greater than had ever before been achieved in war, but in the end defeat was inevitable because of hunger and exhaustion."

Marx, who is no longer in active service, is not the only one in the German army who holds these views. If the army leaders did not agree with him, his opinions would not be printed in the *Militär Wochenblatt;* moreover, the same views are expressed by other officers in active service. General Thomas, chief of the Department of Economy in the War Ministry, speaking before the World Economic Society on the seemingly academic subject of War and Economy in History, said:

> In the field of food supply as well, it is absolutely necessary to plan. The basis of every peace-time policy and still more of every war-time policy should be the nourishment of the population. The food situation in war time is the result of the food policy of the peace years immediately preceding. I do not need to remind you of the period of suffering in our homeland during the World War, and I can say openly that we had already lost the war when we went into the turnip winter of 1916-17.

Thus in the opinion of General Thomas, too, the blockade decided the outcome of the World War. What is the situation today? How does it differ from that of the World War years?

In the first place, it must be stressed that the consequences of a blockade are not felt very early. During the World War it took years for the blockade to bring about the decisive superiority of the Western powers. But the situation is different today in many important respects. In the present war the blockade began a few days after the outbreak of hostilities, and it is already more complete than it was in the World War. German ships have been driven from the seas; the English fleet is

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so superior that Germany cannot challenge it. Then the big powers went into the war with the idea that it would soon be over. Today everyone expects a long war. Furthermore, the economic war and economic factors in general did not at first play an important part. Every combatant entered the war economically unprepared; only gradually did the English learn to use the tools of economic war to forge the weapon of the blockade. Germany was regarded as a fortress under siege, but in the years 1915 and 1916 it was not yet under siege because German imports were still very large. Only in 1916, after two years of war, were fats, meat, and bread rationed.

Two questions arise: (1) What does Germany need to import? (2) Which imports can be cut off by the blockade?

Modern war is a war of machines and industry. Germany leads Europe in industrial production and in armament production as well. But to feed this industrial plant and to assure its functioning, a vast supply of raw materials is necessary. Germany produces not more than two-thirds of the raw materials it needs, and the four-year plan could not better the situation, especially in respect to the most essential materials. Germany needs iron ore and oil. Aside from coal, iron ore is the most important requirement of the iron-and-steel industry, which means the war industry. The necessity of oil in modern war, in which airplanes and tanks play such an overwhelming part, need not be stressed. Furthermore, Germany lacks a sufficient food supply. Its official reports show that even in peace time it must import about 20 per cent of the food it needs. In war time the situation becomes worse for a variety of reasons. Agriculture production is reduced because farmhands must become soldiers, because in war time the whole economic body lives on its capital, because fertilization is diminished, because machinery cannot be replaced, and so on. The German generals know this. In an article, Basis for an Estimate of Germany's Economic Capacity for War, Major Beutler wrote:

> No state can take away from agriculture its best and most productive skilled workers, its horses and machines, and still expect agriculture to produce the same as before. How great a reduction must be allowed for as a result of this military interference depends on the economic structure of the given country. In Middle Europe we shall have to count on a reduction of at least 20 per cent. Adding to that the doubtless increased consumption in war time, which the greater demands of the army alone create, and keeping in view the importance to morale of sufficient food and food of good quality, one must count on a reduction of 20 per cent more. In other words, only that state is self-sufficient which produces at least 40 per cent more than its average consumption of agricultural products.

But Germany's agricultural production is not 40 per cent higher than its average consumption. On the contrary, it must import 20 per cent even in peace time, when the population is not adequately fed. Instead of the 140 per cent which the military economists demand, Germany produces only 80 per cent of its requirements, which means that during the coming war it will produce only a little more than half of what the soldiers, the munitions workers, and the general population should have. We must not forget, of course, that the country has accumulated reserves of oil, iron ore, and foodstuffs. In the first months the conduct of the war will not be hampered by want of materials. But what will happen after a few months or, if the war lasts, years?

The English blockade is only a sea blockade, preventing Germany from getting goods by way of the Atlantic or the Mediterranean. What weight has this overseas trade in the total of German imports? Overseas trade does not play the first role in German foreign trade as it does in that of England. Imports from Europe constitute about three-fifths of German foreign trade, overseas imports two-fifths; the blockade, therefore, hits only 40 per cent of German imports. That is, however, an important proportion, and there are other consequences. The English fleet cannot prevent goods from entering Germany from Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries; but England and the British Empire have economic weapons they can use against these small countries to make them keep their exports to Germany as small as possible.

In this respect the situation is very different from that of 1914. Then the sea blockade was frustrated for some time because the small western and northern European states increased their trade with Germany. Only slowly did the Allies realize this fact and through long and difficult negotiations achieve the reduction of trade between Germany and the small neutrals. Since the English economic general staff has studied very carefully the consequences, direct and indirect, of the World War blockade, we may today expect this trade to be reduced drastically and soon. In consequence, the sea blockade will stop not only the 40 per cent of German imports coming from overseas but much more.

It is obvious that the Third Reich will attempt to find an answer to this economic war. It will increase its pressure against the east. It will take as much as possible from Poland. It will try to force the southeastern European states to fill the gaps made by the blockade. It will try to expand its economic relations with Soviet Russia. Assuming that the Third Reich succeeds in conquering a great part of Poland and holding it for the duration of the war, to what extent will this conquest counteract the effects of the blockade? The population of Poland is 80 per cent agricultural, and this fact has led to a widespread belief that Poland has a great surplus

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of farm products. That is not the case. Poland is so backward in agricultural technique that it has no surplus. The Third Reich can get foodstuffs in appreciable quantities from Poland only if it lets the Polish population starve. But this policy can be carried out only in the cities; if it is applied to farmers, agricultural production will be automatically reduced. Poland can no more supply the food deficiencies of Germany today than it could from 1914 to 1918. And what about other raw materials? Poland has a surplus in only one field, coal. Here the conquest of Poland can materially help Germany. But Poland's oil production is very small, and so is its production of iron ore. The three principal deficiencies of the German economy will not be changed by the conquest of Poland.

Hitler's Germany will therefore strengthen its pressure on the southeastern European countries. Can these states make Germany independent of the sea blockade?

Germany proper, plus the former Austria, has a population of about 75,000,000. If in peace time it must import 20 per cent of its foodstuffs, it must now find ways of feeding some 15,000,000 people. The annexation of Czechoslovakia made no change in the agricultural resources of Germany, for according to the German Institut für Konjunkturforschung Czechoslovakia's exports of agricultural products are offset by its imports. To what extent can the food difficulties of Germany be reduced by the southeastern states? Using the figure 100 to represent equality between agricultural imports and exports and anything above to show the excess of exports, the Institut gives the following figures for the southeastern countries: Yugoslavia, 106; Bulgaria, 109; Rumania, 110; Hungary, 121. If we wish to arrive at an exact estimate of the extent to which these countries could supply German food needs, we must take their population figures into account. In the latest census figures available the population of Yugoslavia is 14,000,000, of Bulgaria 6,000,000, of Rumania 18,000,000, and of Hungary 8,500,000. Yugoslavia, with a population of 14,000,000 and a surplus of 6 per cent, could supply 840,000 more people; Bulgaria, with 6,000,000 people and a surplus of 9 per cent, could supply 540,000; Rumania, with a population of 18,000,000 and a surplus of 10 per cent, could supply 1,800,000; and Hungary, with 8,500,000 people and a surplus of 21 per cent, 1,785,000. On the basis of official German figures, these four countries, if their entire agricultural surplus should go to Germany, could feed about 5,000,000 of the 15,000,000 for whom food is lacking in the Reich.

What about other raw materials? Rumanian oil could play an important part in the German war economy. In peace time Germany used six to seven million tons and produced 2,700,000. The war consumption of any great power is estimated to be three times as great as its peace-time consumption. That means, in Germany, fifteen to twenty million tons. Last year Rumanian oil production was about six million tons. If Rumania could be forced to give to Germany its entire oil production, Germany would find the conduct of the war essentially easier. But six million tons a year would not satisfy its needs in a long war.

The case is even worse with iron ore. The rich raw-material resources of Southeastern Europe, particularly of Yugoslavia, have often been stressed. But it would take decades of work to make these raw materials available in amounts which would really aid Germany. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the production of iron ore in the last year was about one million tons; German imports of iron ore were twenty times as great.

And Russia? Cannot Russia, with its tremendous resources, counterbalance the English blockade? In answering this question it is easy to put down figures: Germany needs so and so many million tons of raw material and foodstuffs; Russia produces so and so many million tons. Therefore Russia's help would be sufficient to torpedo the English blockade.

But Göring's calculations are false in one decisive respect. One cannot balance German needs with Russian production; one must put German needs beside Russian exports. After France, Russia has the greatest iron-ore production in Europe, almost 30,000,000 tons a year, but it exports almost none. Russia is the greatest oil producer in Europe—its production in the last year was about four times that of Rumania—but it exports much less than Rumania because its own needs are so much greater. The U. S. S. R. is becoming, like Germany, an industrial state; even the increased productivity of its agriculture has been brought about by mechanization. And tractors use oil, much oil. Russia has a certain surplus of agricultural products, but its exports of the foodstuffs Germany needs most—meat and fats—are very small. This is because the Russian peasants, in their opposition to collectivization, killed most of their live stock before they entered the collective farms. In 1933 the number of cattle had been reduced from 70,500,000 to 38,400,000, and the number of pigs from 26,000,000 to 12,100,000. These losses have only lately been replaced, and there are still fewer cattle than in 1928. At the same time the population has increased by 15,000,000 since 1928, and consumption is correspondingly greater. And so the question must be asked: Will Russia reduce its own consumption in order to help Germany's war economy? I think this is not very probable. Stalin's policy is to secure a balance of power in Europe; he is not interested in seeing Hitler become master. He may deliver something, but he will not deliver in such amounts as to weaken Russia's power. Furthermore, preparation for war will greatly increase Russia's own consumption of oil, iron ore, and foodstuffs.

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To sum up: Poland can deliver coal to Germany; Southeastern Europe can give foodstuffs; Rumania can give oil; Russia can contribute oil and foodstuffs. The blockade of Germany is made more difficult by these possible sources of supply. But the blockade will be successful in a long war just as it was in the last war, when Germany had conquered Poland, Southeastern Europe, a part of Russia, Belgium, and a part of France. In the end these conquests did not help; Germany lost the economic war. The blockade is a weapon which takes time. If the Western powers have enough staying power, the final success will be theirs.

What Our Warships Cost

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

VAST and far-reaching have been the changes in public opinion during the past ten years, but nowhere has the alteration been more complete than in the attitude toward national defense. In the last session of Congress a naval bill totaling nearly eight hundred million dollars was approved by overwhelming majorities not only of "big navy" men but of liberals, economy advocates, and erstwhile pacifists. So complete was the approval that little attention was paid in either house to the details of the bill; the newspapers scarcely commented on it, and the general public was indifferent. Ten years ago such a bill would have aroused violent opposition. The advocates of increased armaments were then in the minority and were unable to present a convincing case, while their opponents were both numerous and vocal. The change brought about by spreading and continued international lawlessness is indicated by recent polls of public opinion which show that a greatly increased navy is favored now by about three-fourths of the American public.

If so little consideration has been given to the huge sum appropriated, will any particular interest be taken in its judicious expenditure?

Many Americans naively assume that with the close of the war, profiteering at the expense of the government very largely ceased. Others believe that the revelations of the Nye committee caused the disappearance of many of the more objectionable features of arming. Actually, so far as naval rearmament is concerned, the exact opposite is the case. The most expensive battleship now in the navy is the Maryland, constructed during the World War period of cost inflation at the then excessive cost of $27,564,481. The Pennsylvania, a slightly smaller ship, cost only half as much owing to her completion before war prices prevailed. Let us compare the cost of these ships with that of the battleships now being built, contracts for which were drawn in a period unaffected by war prices or war profiteering.

When bids were opened for the first battleship to be constructed for the navy since the war, everyone was surprised but the shipbuilders. The bid of Bethlehem stood at sixty million, that of New York Shipbuilding and Dry Dock at only slightly less. Since this price was exclusive of armor and armament, estimated at from twenty to twenty-six million, it was obvious that the new ships, if built by private shipbuilders, were going to prove exceedingly expensive. Fortunately, the navy had directed its yards at New York and Philadelphia to prepare estimates of the cost of a sister ship. Both of these estimates were in the neighborhood of thirty-seven million. Under these circumstances President Roosevelt ordered both ships to be built in government yards. This step, however, proved to be more or less of a gesture which could not be repeated owing to the limited capacity of navy yards. When four battleships were authorized in 1938, navy yards could not take care of them all. Private yards were then given the contracts for three of them at prices ranging from forty-nine to fifty-three million apiece. It would seem that the private yards had become momentarily apprehensive, as their bids were only from twelve to sixteen million higher than navy-yard estimates. Estimates of the ultimate total costs of the ships range from seventy to one hundred million each, or about three times the cost of the most expensive battleship built previously. The cost of battleships of the same size building in Great Britain is around forty-three million each.

Granting that there are some improvements in the new ships over the Maryland and her sisters, such superiority can scarcely explain a three-to-one differential in price. The new battleships are to be of 35,000 tons and to carry nine sixteen-inch guns. The armor will be very heavy and the estimated speed about twenty-six knots. The Maryland is of 32,600 tons, has a speed of twenty-one knots, and carries eight sixteen-inch guns. Her exceptionally heavy armor is probably equal to that of the newer battleships. In other words, the newer ships provide an increase in gun-power of about 12½ per cent, in speed of about 25 per cent, perhaps a slight increase in protection, and an increase in cost of 250 to 350 per cent.

And not battleships alone cost an excessive amount. In a recent issue of the *Proceedings of the United States*

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Navy Institute, a semi-professional magazine read largely by naval officers, it was stated that the new American destroyers of 1,500 tons are probably the best vessels of their size and class afloat. They should be. Whereas British vessels of the same type cost less than two million each, the American ships cost more than four million, a figure which American naval officers themselves regard as absurdly high. Nor is this the worst. The lowest bid for destroyers of the 1938 program on a fixed-price basis was entered by Bath Iron Works, which bid $5,627,000 for one destroyer or $5,153,000 for each of two. (In 1933, 1,500-ton destroyers were contracted for at $3,400,000 each; in 1934 at $3,430,000; in 1935 at $3,675,000; and in 1936 at $4,125,000—the amount given in each case being the figure of the lowest bid.) Destroyers at eight million each are not improbable if present trends in the cost of shipbuilding continue. World War destroyers, a fifth smaller than those now being built and constructed under cost-plus contracts which permitted extensive profiteering, cost on the average about a million and a half each.

What is true of battleships and destroyers is true in varying degrees of every other type of naval vessel. Airplane carriers, cruisers, submarines, auxiliaries—all show a rise in cost entirely disproportionate to their natural increase in size and offensive power. The price of 10,000-ton cruisers, as measured by low bids from private shipyards, increased from $8,196,000 to $15,525,000 between December 14, 1932, and August 8, 1935. Submarines have shown a smaller increase in price, but since the Electric Boat Company has for years possessed a monopoly of private submarine building in the United States through its ownership of all the patents, it is safe to guess that the most recent bid, $4,657,000 for a single craft, leaves a large margin of profit.

What is the cause of the extreme cost of American naval building? Are American naval architects more wasteful and prone to make blunders than members of their profession abroad? Is the productivity of American labor too low, or have wages and the cost of materials become unreasonably high, as is claimed by shipbuilders? In the main the answer to these questions is a negative one. Naval planners do occasionally make mistakes which necessitate an alteration of plans on ships under construction, with consequent delay and expense. However, naval architects abroad are not immune from making the same mistakes. American labor is the most productive per unit of any in the world. While the cost of labor and materials is somewhat higher in the United States than abroad this cannot account for the entire difference. Clearly we must look elsewhere for the major cause.

A significant clue is obtained from an examination of successful bids for the construction of American warships in any particular year. In 1927 the building of six cruisers of identical type was authorized. The successful bids were as follows:

Bethlehem	$10,675,000
American Brown Boveri Electric Corp.	10,815,000
Puget Sound Navy Yard	8,395,000
Mare Island Navy Yard	7,539,000
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock	10,567,000

It should be noted that the successful bids from private yards were from 25 to 30 per cent higher than those from government yards. The comparable charges for battleships have been previously considered. The Nye committee in 1935 reported that the average difference between private-company and navy-yard costs of destroyers was around a million dollars.

The percentage of profit on these vessels, although not definitely known in most cases, is high. At the time of the Congressional munitions investigation in 1935 the only figures of profit available ranged from 22 to 38 per cent. Since that date more naval building has taken place, and bids have risen steadily. As profits usually go up when there is a demand for ships, the percentage of profit probably now exceeds that of former years.

At this point the average citizen is likely to ask a question: Why do not navy yards enter bids on all vessels and so force the prices of shipbuilders down to reasonable levels? The only answer that can be given is contained in the statement that the Navy Department for some years past has followed the practice of awarding at least half the contracts for the building of naval vessels to private yards regardless of the amount of the bids, the theory being that hard-hitting competition among bidders would force bids down to reasonable levels.

Such a theory presupposes the existence of a large number of shipbuilding firms, all avid for profit and without mutual agreements or understandings regarding the distribution of prospective business. Unfortunately these conditions have not existed for years in the shipbuilding industry. The Big Three—New York Shipbuilding, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, and Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company—are the only firms in the United States with facilities for building large battleships and airplane carriers. With one or two exceptions they have also built all cruisers awarded to private shipyards. The building of destroyers has been largely confined to the Big Three and the Little Three—Bath Iron Works, Federal Shipbuilding Company, and United Dry Docks. That these firms have at least "understandings" which enable them to avoid competition is proved by several facts. Testimony before the Nye committee indicates that conferences of shipbuilders were held before each important bidding on naval vessels. On occasion one or more of the prospective bidders have known which bidders would get the various vessels long before the bids were opened.

Probably the best-known method of avoiding com-

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petition is identical bidding. For several years this device was employed by the three firms manufacturing armor plate for war vessels. Bids are always made at a high enough level to assure a profit. Although all ship builders are required to make an affidavit that they are not in collusion or agreement, collusion is almost impossible to prove unless the prima facie evidence of identical or questionable bids is accepted.

During the last several years identical bids have been going out of style, and the protective bid has become more common. In July, 1933, when the first contracts for warships were awarded under the New Deal, shipbuilders of all types were eager for work. It was interesting, therefore, to note that not only were the bids almost evenly divided among the Big Three, but Bethlehem was low bidder for a cruiser at a price of $11,720,000, although on December 14, 1932, the same company had bid $8,196,000 for a very similar ship. This rise in price could not have been caused by the higher cost of labor and materials, for at the same time Bethlehem bid lower for two destroyers than it had bid for ships of identical type less than two years before. Why the increased price for cruisers and not for destroyers? Senator Trammell of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs perhaps supplied the answer when he urged that the bids be rejected as showing collusion since the only two other companies competing for cruisers had apparently bid needlessly high in order to protect Bethlehem in its bid. Firms able to build destroyers were more numerous, and here real competition might be feared.

Use of another device to defeat competition and insure large profits was admirably illustrated recently. In March, 1939, the government opened bids for a 20,000-ton aircraft carrier, a shipbuilders' prize second only to a battleship. Oddly enough only one firm, Newport News, entered a bid. This bid, nearly thirty-five million, was far from low, but since it was the only one entered, Newport News obtained the contract. In order to divide the work and keep up the price each yard bids only on certain vessels. If orders for six destroyers are to be placed, each yard bids on two, and at a fairly high figure. Thus ships of the same type in a given year may cost very different amounts. In actual practice, during the last twenty years large ships have been almost equally divided among the Big Three.

In the larger classes of warships as in submarines, the monopoly is nearly air tight. Occasionally, however, there is a threat of competition. In 1933 the shipbuilding industry was thrown into a panic by the appearance of a new firm, Gulf Industries, Inc., of Pensacola, Florida. In order to buy more equipment, the firm applied to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for a large loan. At this point the shipbuilders decided upon action. Governor Moore of New Jersey and the entire New Jersey delegation in Congress were begged to use all the influence at their command to prevent the granting of the loan. Letters were hastily dispatched to James Farley and President Roosevelt urging that Gulf Industries be given no government help. The loan was not made.

Despite this disappointment Gulf Industries entered the lowest regular bid for the construction of destroyers in 1933. Yet it failed to receive any business. At the same time the company stated that it was prepared to submit bids on cruisers which would save the government millions of dollars a year. Although the navy was being charged three and a half million more than for the last previous ship of the type, Gulf Industries got no attention. Two years later the president, L. R. Wilder, testifying before the Senate committee investigating the munitions industry, stated that he had been advised to get in touch with A. P. Homer, who for a fee of $250,000 could secure him contracts worth from ten to fifteen million. Mr. Wilder did not follow this advice and did not get any contract. In 1935 Mr. Homer sued Bath Iron Work for $50,000 which he asserted was owed him for activities designated to bring naval business to that concern.

Undeterred by its failures of the previous year, Gulf Industries in 1934 submitted a cruiser bid more than a million dollars less than that of the next lowest bidder, Newport News, which got the business. In the same year three comparatively new firms—Gulf Industries, Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Dry Dock, and General Engineering—submitted bids for destroyers that were considerably lower than those of the companies securing the contracts. Senator Hiram Johnson of California protested against the unfairness of refusing contracts to West Coast firms when their bids were lower and their location was more convenient for the navy. However, his request for reconsideration received no response.

The position of the navy itself in regard to shipbuilding has not always been above criticism. On June 23, 1933, C. L. Bardo, at that time president of the New York Shipbuilding Company and later of the National Manufacturers' Association, wrote to the chairman of his board: ". . . I know from my talks with some of the representatives of the navy who are keenly interested in this work, that they are desirous of finding some substantial reasons for awarding this work to the largest possible extent to private yards. . . . There was also expressed to us the desire that the builders themselves should get together and agree as far as we could upon what each would bid and then bid on nothing else."

One of the reasons for the high cost of naval vessels built in private yards is to be found in the system of bidding now in use. Firms entering bids on warships may do so in one of two ways. A bid may be made on a fixed-sum basis or with an adjustment provision to the effect that the government will protect the contractor from loss resulting from any changes in the prices of labor and

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materials during the period of construction. The latter is generally termed an alternate bid. Bids made on a fixed-sum basis without adjustment provisions are made large enough to cover all possible sources of extra expense and give a large profit besides. But high as they generally are, they have certain points of superiority to alternate bids. When the navy awards contracts with an agreement to protect the company against changes in the price of labor and materials, it immediately faces the likelihood of inflation of costs. The Nye committee found many indications that increased overhead and other expenses were being added to the expense accounts of naval vessels as additional costs for labor and materials. Without an army of auditors constantly busy during the construction of a vessel, prevention of such "mistakes" is nearly impossible. Bids with adjustment provisions mean absolutely nothing with respect to the ultimate cost of a naval vessel. Fixed-sum and alternate bids have one common denominator: the government loses.

This situation has existed in the shipbuilding industry, though to a lesser degree, for several decades; only the administrations of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt have investigated conditions or made serious efforts to improve them. The munitions investigation of 1935 revealed some exceptionally malodorous conditions in munitions. Not wanting were indications of collusion, high-priced lobbying, and bribery, with the navy itself often serving as a willing tool or at best as an indifferent spectator to the machinations of the shipbuilders. After these disclosures Congressmen fell over themselves in the effort to introduce drastic legislation designed to take the profit out of war and war preparation. Most of these measures, however, were quietly pigeonholed in committee. That there has been no genuine improvement in conditions is due to two factors—public forgetfulness and the apathy of Congress. President Roosevelt showed a willingness to deal with the problem in 1937 when he violated precedent by awarding contracts for both new battleships to navy yards. In February, 1938, urging a 20 per cent increase in naval strength, he also recommended legislation to do away with profiteering and equalize the burdens of the cost of a possible war, saying with considerable irony, "Such legislation has been the subject for many years of full studies in this and preceding Congresses."

This last recommendation received next to no mention by the press. Congress accepted the President's plan for a 20 per cent naval increase but failed even to consider the important issue of profiteering. The 1939 session of Congress was equally barren of legislation against war profits. Meanwhile munitions firms are running overtime, and prices for naval vessels and war materials of all sorts are shooting skyward. If no questions are asked about the price, how far will a mere eight hundred million go in the provision of naval defense?

In the Wind

THE "WAVERLY," a handbook issued to freshmen at the Washington Square College of New York University, carries brief descriptions of various campus organizations. Of the Socialist Club it cryptically reports: "Discusses and teaches the principles of socialism. Indorsed by *Good Housekeeping.*"

A WEST COAST magazine called the *Guardian,* organ of the "Owners and Lessees Apartment House Association," runs this notice to potential contributors: "Short, constructive typewritten articles by members and other responsible citizens invited for possible publication. No MMS returned unless you send your chauffeur after them."

SPORTING NEWS: Secretaries of sporting clubs throughout Massachusetts are receiving propaganda from an organization calling itself the "Industrial Defense Association," with headquarters in Boston. The association warns that a "red revolution" is on its way in the United States and pleads: "Is it not time for Christian sportsmen to take defensive measures against such an uprising?"

VISITING THE Dies committee hearings recently, Mary B. Gilson, distinguished Chicago University economist, patiently watched Dies chew gum, then irritably sent him this note: "I am a Midwesterner with a good deal of respect for our government and its elected representatives. You don't realize perhaps how gum-chewing seems to my naive self not in keeping with Congressional dignity." A moment later she got back a penciled reply: "It so happens I have just been compelled to quit smoking after twenty years, due to heart trouble. If you ever tried to quit smoking you would know when chewing gum is necessary."

NO LESS disturbed than American Communists by the Nazi-Soviet pact, most Hitler sympathizers in the United States are trying to explain it all to their followers The frankest comment appears in *Liberation,* William Pelley's Silver Shirt journal. "Chief" Pelley writes: "I cannot see eye to eye with Adolf Hitler in his economic alliance with communistic Russia, and had I been in his position—based upon such knowledge of the alliance as I now possess—I would have spurned Russian aid in any form whatever rather than tarnish my anti-communistic principles."

THE JUNE issue of the German periodical *Monatshefte* carried this deft apology for a tribute to King Zog that had appeared in its May issue: "The May number was already printed and bound when the swift and surprising intervention of the Duce put an end to the splendor of King Zog of Albania and showed him up to the world in his true light. We regret to state that, for that reason, it was not possible to recast the passage in accordance with the actual facts now revealed. We do not doubt that our readers, enlightened by the daily press, will have made the necessary corrections of their own accord."

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.* —EDITORS THE NATION.]

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Issues and Men

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

The United States and the War

London, September 8

TO ALL of us American correspondents over here it seems as if the United States were taking this war far more excitedly and tragically than the people of this country, whose amazing calm I have already stressed in this correspondence. We are told that various American admirals and generals have, as usual, burst into print to declare that the only lesson for the United States is that it must arm at once, still more. It must not be content with the $2,000,000,000 voted by the last Congress but must add another billion just as soon as Congress reassembles. There is certainly not the slightest reason for this unless the United States intends at once to enter the war. Actually, from the purely military point of view, the security of the United States has been increased by the outbreak of war. And the longer war continues, the safer the United States will be, if it ever was in danger. For with each day that passes, the exhaustion of the contestants will become greater—through the piling up their debts, the sinking of their ships, the ruination of their trade, the steady impoverishment and demoralization of their peoples.

But, I can hear the admirals and generals saying, what if Germany wins? Will not Hitler then promptly come over and conquer us and South America? The answer is emphatically no. Hitler has not enough ships in the German merchant marine to move even a hundred thousand men with the necessary arms and supplies, and his navy is insignificant in strength in comparison to our own. If he wins, he will have an exhausted people, half-starved and ready to rebel at any suggestion of further conquest. And all Europe will have to be held down by huge German forces. Hitler certainly will not be able to take over the British navy and use it against us. He will never get his hands on it; any more than the English got the German navy at the end of the last war.

If Hitler loses the war, there will have been removed the one country in Europe that could be considered an enemy to the United States. The only possible enemy remaining is Japan, which at the moment is so disgusted with Germany for betraying it that it will be less inclined than ever to start hostilities with us. And once more, for the hundredth time, I wish to stress the fact that Japan cannot physically make war upon us nor we upon Japan. On this page I have repeatedly quoted opinions of high naval and military officers to this effect, including the positive opinion of the commander-in-chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt himself, uttered when he was not in office and not in a position to indulge himself by playing with and commanding a huge fleet. Will somebody mention a third nation which might in any way menace the United States? Certainly both France and England will have been bled white if this war lasts any length of time; and Italy will never be in a position to menace the United States. And why should it? Its eyes are on Africa. It wishes to dominate the Mediterranean. It could no more attack the North American Colossus than it could undertake an expedition to the moon. Moreover, Mussolini, like Hitler, is a scoundrel who has to hold down his subjects by force.

No, the truth is that if reason and logic, and not sentiment, hysteria, and self-interest, were applied to this question, the American army and navy would take the lead in advocating disarmament—always provided that we are not going to be so insane as to go to war in Europe again. I am even hoping that my friends the editors of *The Nation* will now turn about and join me in exposing the needless waste of the terrific military expenditures we are now making, to say nothing of the steady militarization of the country. I hope they will also give a great deal of space to recording the very important movement under way over here, led by the London *Times,* the Manchester *Guardian,* the *New Statesman and Nation,* and many distinguished individuals, to bring about a prompt statement of Allied war aims. If these aims are just, they will be the best possible propaganda to drop within the German lines.

So far, every proposal that I have seen calls for the scrapping of the League of Nations and the building of a Federal State of Europe; it is believed that the continent cannot continue to live and develop in an atmosphere of crisis after crisis, war alarm after war alarm. In this the United States can help enormously, and it has already been suggested that President Roosevelt be asked to sound out neutral opinion everywhere on the form the new order should take. Here is a better opportunity for American leadership than any to be found in wasting more money on absolutely needless armaments. My fellow-countrymen can sleep in peace. They are not being got out of bed, as we are here, by the air-raid sirens, and there is not the slightest danger that they ever will be. They are not awaiting the inevitable destruction of life and property in the city in which they live. Let them be calm, and work for a new world and a decent one.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

A "Superheated Observer"

A VICTORIAN IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Hutchins Hapgood. Harcourt, Brace and Company. $5.

THE modern world into which this passionately experimental Victorian emerged and which he experienced with the naive and innocent fervor of a Dostoevskyan character, though at the same time observing himself in the spirit of a Dostoevsky, is already crystallized into a past bursting with personal revolt, unlimited social faith and reforming energy, and much happy creative foolishness.

No one could communicate better the seething quality of the pre-war world of metropolitan American radical-bohemian liberalism than Hutchins Hapgood. He was a good seether and he knew all the other seethers. Yet he was never a joiner, rather "a superheated observer" as Leo Stein remarked, always "looking for God in every dust bin," as Mabel Dodge recorded, and finding him oftener there than anywhere else. An explorer of human nature, he was the reporter, friend, and interpreter of the most advanced views and personalities in labor, art, and personal behavior, of the oppressed and exploited, of the eccentrics and misfits of civilization, for whom he had a special sympathy untainted by reforming zeal.

Looking for life and literary material he discovered the East Side and wrote "The Spirit of the Ghetto"; discovered radical labor and wrote "The Spirit of Labor" (with Anton Johannsen) and "An Anarchist Woman"; hungrily studied the human values of toughs, bums, drunks, spielers, and thieves in Bowery saloons and dance halls and wrote "The Autobiography of a Thief" and "Types from City Streets"; looked into his own heart and wrote "The Story of a Lover," unfortunately suppressed for its unconventional inclusiveness.

Thronging figures of the many worlds he touched mill about in these pages in striking and fragmentary glimpses, portrayed with a disarming blend of critical forthrightness and warm human acceptance. His brothers Norman and William are here; William James and Santayana of the Harvard days; study and loafing in Europe with the Bernard Berensons and the Steins, Leo and Gertrude; the "movers and shakers" of the Mabel Dodge salon; John Reed, Lincoln Steffens, Josiah Flynt; Dreiser, Hemingway, Max Eastman; Emma Goldman, Berkman, Bill Haywood; the Provincetown group, Neith Boyce, his wife, Susan Glaspell and George Cram Cook; the Armory Show; the new generation of radicals and fanatics, with their differences from his own; these are only some of the ingredients in this rich brew.

This is a kaleidoscopic, chaotic, and ingenuous book. The first half has a unity, felicity, and poignancy which are necessarily dissipated in the second, to which it is the prelude and key. For here the author performs the somewhat magic feat of drawing the reader into the core of the inner conflict that built up a childish personality of excessive sensibility to emotional and aesthetic experience, violent and shy, dreamy, combative, and gentle, savoring the expanding consciousness of life with a lyric bewilderment and intensity and groping toward contacts and security along such detours as the blocking of a main road leaves possible. It was blocked, apparently, as much by the lack of spiritual sustenance in his parents' mild agnosticism as by his father's contempt for music and dancing. Whatever the obstacle was, it developed a romantic individualism, a mysticism, which the boy whose best friend had been a young idiot to whom he could unfold himself with a freedom that deserted him among the normal, recognized as already his own when many years later he came to read the great Russian novelists who taught a whole generation to prostrate itself before the saintliness and vileness of the human soul. He had always had this strange love for those who existed on the verge of insecurity, social, moral, or intellectual; the depraved and stunted seemed closest to the great inner reality which escaped him.

Everything had a symbolic quality in which physical sensation and spiritual insight fused and heightened each other, and any experience which increased the sense of self seemed about to disclose the great secret. Drinking to excess and sexual promiscuity were gestures of a noble revolt to the last Victorians, while their children, having no sense of guilt and a more impersonal social fervor, do as they please without remorse or exhibitionism. But the individualism that sometimes wallowed with God in the dust bin was also dedicated to ideals of social freedom that valued life above opinion and sought the harmonization of its varieties rather than the power to crush them.

Mr. Hapgood's story is a period piece that vividly retains the surface gleams and forms of the society that produced it. There is nothing one can say for or against that way of life that he does not say himself, thus saving one the trouble. He is as amiably ready to say *mea culpa* as he is to grant himself absolution. Maybe he wasted his life, he remarks, enjoying it so, but he did enjoy it. And people who enjoy, who approach life as artists and lovers, do not persecute. Maybe there is something in that.

CLARA GRUENING STILLMAN

Winston Churchill as Prophet

STEP BY STEP. 1936-1939. By Winston S. Churchill. G. P. Putnam's Sons. $4.

MILLIONS of Britons were cheered when, as their country took the plunge into war, the news came through that Winston Churchill was to be in charge once again of the navy with a seat in the war Cabinet. No more effective signal could have been given that the battle against Hitlerism was going to be pursued with the utmost determination. For Churchill, alone among leading British Tories, realized long ago the kind of menace that the Nazi revolution offered, not merely to Germany's small neighbors, but to European civilization, to democracy, and, not least, to the

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British Empire. Year in, year out, in Parliament and in the press he urged the building up of a system of collective security and the simultaneous strengthening of British defenses. It is partly due to his crusading that these defenses are now in a comparatively formidable state. But he was not able to win acceptance for the first and more important part of his program until too late; and the present catastrophe is the result.

From March, 1936, to May of this year Churchill contributed a fortnightly article to the press commenting on international affairs. In this book these articles have been reprinted exactly as they appeared, and now that their Cassandra-like prophecies have been fulfilled to the letter they form a tragic but valuable record. They begin with Hitler's repudiation of the Locarno Treaty and military reoccupation of the Rhineland. Churchill argued that this was the occasion for the League of Nations to establish its authority for all time by passing judgment on Germany's action and mustering overwhelming force to make that judgment respected. "Stop it! Stop it now!" he demanded. "The world, nay, Europe alone, is overwhelmingly strong compared to any single member of its family. But there must be Concert and Design guided by farsighted unselfishness and inexorable resolve. This is no task for France, no task for Britain, no task for the Locarno powers or any group of powers; it is a task for all." But while insisting that German aggression must be curbed, Churchill also urged that collective action should be taken to meet genuine grievances and anxieties.

Again and again in this book we find him hammering at this theme. He recognized the dangers that collective security involved, but, he pointed out, how much greater were the perils of drifting, of yielding to blackmail. In the middle of last September's crisis he wrote: "Why should we wait until the worst has happened before being ready to run risks? . . . If this moment is lost through hesitancy, however well-meaning, and war should come, as come it may, perhaps quite soon, how vain will be reproaches and regrets, how vast the tragedy of mankind."

And now that the worst has happened, Winston Churchill is called back from the long political exile to which his party's traditional distrust of brilliance condemned him, to help Britain overcome the most dangerous enemy it has ever faced. Behind him he leaves half a dozen careers and a record of great achievements marred by equally great errors of judgment. But at this hour he is the white hope among British statesmen, and if he can rise to the opportunity he may yet rank in history with his ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough.

KEITH HUTCHISON

Thomas Craven's Favorite Prints

A TREASURY OF AMERICAN PRINTS. Edited by Thomas Craven. 100 Aquatones with Biographical Notes and Introduction. Simon and Schuster. $3.95.

FOR several years now Thomas Craven has been posing as the spokesman of what is truly American in art. He continues this performance in the present collection of contemporary prints, of which he is the editor. Once again his favorites—Curry and Grant Wood and the drawling Benton, the Manhattan-recorder Marsh, and the gentle, humorous Sloan—dominate the collection (27 out of 100 plates). To them he has added Peggy Bacon (5 plates), no doubt because he likes her tart little "remarks." Then he has some secondary favorites: Adolf Dehn with his lithographs of city and country, John Costigan with his sentimental etchings, Lauren Ford with her incidents and fragments, Gropper with his meaty satires, George Grosz with his hates, and Harry Wickey with his scenes of occasional song. These, together with his first choices, take 51 of the plates, which leaves a bare half for all the rest of the Americans.

And what of them? The distinguished Marin is given one plate, the same as the unknown Lee Townsend. Eugene Higgins, that Ryder of the workingman, likewise with one, is placed on the same footing as the pinched and ineffectual Lucioni. The sensational Cadmus, on the other hand, receives as much as Marin and Higgins together. Paul Clemens, who all too evidently hasn't forgotten his Daumier, is apparently considered just as important as that proved and intelligent experimenter, Charles Sheeler. The inept Francis Chapin should not have been included at all, while two plates are at least one too many for the academician Locke. Two plates are also given to de Martelly, whose woebegone figures of starvation look as if they had been dressed up in garments of masquerade and then set to posing for their picture. Incidentally, these two academicians are rated the same as the merry Waldo Peirce and the rippling Wanda Gàg (whose notes on her work, by the way, are the best in the book). It is misemphases such as these that make one distrust the soundness of the editor's judgment, even when one has no quarrel with the individual selections.

But more glaring are the omissions. Where is that "naturalist who just happened to be an etcher," Frank Benson? Where is the scrupulous and indefatigable John Taylor Arms, whose etchings have long ranked him among the leading practitioners in his medium both here and abroad? Where is Kerr Eby, whose New England snow scenes are, in their way, excellent Americana? Why the omission of J. J. Lankes? What of the etchings and woodcuts of Allen Lewis, who has been a pioneer and man of discrimination for many years? Where is Benjamin Kopman, with his "singing" blacks and whites? All these are Americans too, and recognized ones. How can a book which omits them pretend to be inclusive?

And what claim to authority can it have when it attempts to dismiss John Marin as an "eclectic"? It would be gratifying if Mr. Craven would name one work in the last thirty years which justifies this epithet. It would also be interesting to know what he means by including Heilige Nacht and The General, both admirable works by George Grosz in his German period, in an *American* collection. And while he is at it, will he explain why the presence of Hodler, a Swiss, is always intruding itself in the supposedly 100 per cent American works of Grant Wood? These questions are posed merely because Mr. Craven has been insisting so splenetically on the unadulterated Americanism of himself and those whom he favors. And it might be well, just as a matter of art criticism, to know why he admires the clumsy drawing of Curry, and what prompts him to support the statement that "most woodcuts are transparently ephemeral in quality"? One wonders, indeed, why Mr. Craven was chosen to edit

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this collection in the first place, for he is the man who once wrote that "Rembrandt's etchings are almost the sole excuse for the existence of the finical and laborious process of scratching smudged pieces of copper."

In any case, this is a depleted treasury. Some day another selection will be made which will be more truly representative of America. In such a book our two premier etchers, Sloan and Marin, would be put where they belong, at the head of the list. One pities the folk in the cities; the other sings the glory of the Maine coast and the skyscraper. Benton would be present, for the hill-billies and "crackers" and local Twains speak through him. The tawdry, spotted city of Marsh would have a place. So would the workers of Gropper, the snippy ones of Peggy Bacon, the wheatfields of Dehn, the striving fishermen of Higgins, the peasant-like gaiety of Wanda Gàg, and the lurching of Peirce. All these are American. So, too, are the soaring ducks of Benson, the social passion of Kopman, the Yankee meticulousness of Arms, the Robert Frost black-and-whites of Lankes, the silent New England snowfields of Eby. Broad and high and minute and wonderful, America lies waiting for such presentation, but not at the hands of Mr. Craven, because, despite all his protestations, he champions not America but merely that limited part of it which is composed of his own favorites.

JEROME MELLQUIST

Studies in American Culture

LIBERAL KENTUCKY, 1780-1828. By Niels Henry Sonne. Columbia University Press. $3.

JEDIDIAH MORSE, A CHAMPION OF NEW ENGLAND ORTHODOXY. By James King Morse. Columbia University Press. $2.50.

THE EARLY DAYS OF CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM IN AMERICA. By James Dombrowski. Columbia University Press. $2.50.

A CHANGE, long overdue, seems to be taking place as to the consideration of religion as a factor in our history. The earlier tendency of historians was to close the discussion at the point when religious freedom was written into the statutes. But the political power of many of the sects, particularly during the formative years of the republic, is now pretty fully recognized, and the varied forms of religious expression are seen to represent significant phases of our cultural life. A few years ago we had T. C. Hall's admirable "Religious Backgrounds of American Culture." Now the first three volumes in the newly initiated Studies in American Culture describe distinct episodes in religious or sectarian thought and activity.

Mr. Sonne portrays a long and relentless conflict in Kentucky, extending over a period of forty years from 1780, with Transylvania University as the prize. On one side was a small group of Presbyterians who conducted an unscrupulous campaign, employing slander, anonymous attacks, and political chicanery. On the other was a rich complex of social and intellectual thought which had a notable place in Lexington during these years, appearing most conspicuously in Buchanan, Holley, and a few others now less known. No adequate history of Transylvania exists, nothing more than a biographical sketch of Holley. Mr. Sonne has had to do a solid piece of pioneering to develop his materials, and he has done this exceedingly well. His detail is rich and much of it is new. As to his sweeping and undocumented conclusions we may enter a few queries. Holley was forced to resign, and Mr. Sonne believes that the orthodox Presbyterian contingent henceforth governed education in Kentucky. But there are signs even among the orthodox, notably in the Peers report, of fertile ideas astir. As to Transylvania, the view that the university went into a hopeless decline after Holley's resignation is the conventional one. The controversy had been on religious grounds; the teaching of science and the law, for which Transylvania was justly famous, was hardly touched by it. As late as 1840, to go no farther, creditable work was being done there with excellent equipment.

It was hardly to be expected that the Unitarianism represented by Holley, a thorough New England product, would take root in Kentuky. Nor was the harsh struggle an isolated struggle. Puritanism was now strongly embattled on many fronts. The evangelical sects were all on the rise, nowhere more positively than in Kentucky, the scene of the Great Revival. Quite apart from the controversy over Transylvania, these forces were bound to exert an increasing influence upon education. On the liberal side Mr. Sonne also fails to take general forces into account. One would not guess from his narrative that the free-thinking intellectualism in Kentucky had had its broad base in the East, and particularly in the colonial South, or that it made an essential groundwork for contemporary thought in this whole period. Yet a discussion of these interrelationships would seem essential if the movement in Kentucky is to be fully understood, if its losses and gains are to be appraised.

The geographer and Calvinist minister Jedidiah Morse makes a frame on which to drape an unpleasant episode in the battle of Old Lights against New Lights in Massachusetts during the same era. We have Morse between his geographic and his Indian periods, and even within these limits the outlines are blurred. Significant items sink into footnotes; often, as in the case of the Hannah Adams controversy, they are unexplained. The author says that Morse had "the habit of saying one thing in public while he was doing just the opposite." This is to put it mildly. The word "cant" takes on a fresh meaning from the fragments of Morse's letters and sermons. The *odium theologicum* was a medium in which he almost sensually sported. If he concentrated a phase of American culture, why not let us have the dimensional portrait? A broadly drawn psychopathic study might have social and perhaps cultural values. As it is, we have only the minutiae of a miserable antagonism.

"The Early Days of Christian Socialism in America" begins at a point in time nearly a hundred years later than the other two volumes, in the early eighteen seventies: Mr. Dombrowski describes the socialized religious philosophy of Henry George, Ely, Bellamy, Bliss, Lloyd, Graham Taylor, Herron, and others, with a chapter on related ideas as these were developed in theological seminaries. Though the materials are not new, Mr. Dombrowski has humanized them in his portrayals, and also by the way in which he lights up motives and emotions and ideas as these appear in related movements and counter-movements. And the emphasis is

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new. In recent criticism the religious background of these figures has usually been scanted; Mr. Dombrowski shows it to have been formative and essential, though he suggests other influences in the rise of sociology and social psychology and by his well-integrated account of the contemporary labor movement.

This is a useful book, handily put together, but curiously suspended in mid-air. It presents no scrap of material on the religious communes in flower when the theologians who dominate the other two volumes were sharpening their tomahawks. These communes multiplied in succeeding decades, and some of them, notably the Shakers, still existed in strength during the period which Mr. Dombrowski discusses. Surely they bear some relation to his subject. His book closes abruptly at the end of Herron's career. Did social Christianity expire with Herron? Why not suggest the further outcome up to the time when Father Coughlin began to garble the phrases of this group? Above all, why not evaluate these ideas and activities? Were they a flash in the pan, or have they left a substantial residue? We are left in the dark as to Mr. Dombrowski's conclusions.

These books are all sharply segmented. The sense of relative values, the free play of judgment and allusion are absent. This reviewer believes that a richer, more liberal treatment is essential if such studies are to be brought under the heading of American culture. One is reminded of Mr. Sonne's statement that the intellectual forces in Kentucky failed because they did not enlist the popular imagination. A similar outcome can occur in the realm of scholarship. This is not to ask for a rough-and-ready popularization; but surely descriptive work of this character exists to be appropriated. Whatever may be given it by way of orientation widens understanding of the whole field. It may be contended that breadth of interpretation is not aimed at, that the worth of these studies is factual, perhaps that the time has not yet come for interpretation. The argument is familiar; indeed, the dissenting view belongs to a controversy as deep—we will hope not as angry—as any between New Lights and Old Lights. Here at any rate is dissent. Approaches in these volumes are constrained. As they stand, it would be easy to consider many of the issues of which they treat transitory or sterile.

In format these books are exceptionally well designed: plain but handsome, they are so well manufactured that they might well provide a standard for all but ephemeral publications.

CONSTANCE ROURKE

Horney Versus Freud

NEW WAYS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Karen Horney. W. W. Norton and Company. $3.

IN PROPER technical usage, psychoanalysis has reference only to the psychological theories and practices of Sigmund Freud and his close followers. This group of individuals undoubtedly constitutes a "school," but of all the various schools dealing with psychopathological phenomena it is the most scientific, in that it deals in systematic fashion with nearly all the vital psychological problems. On laying down Karen Horney's recent book I have severe doubts that she is still to be called a psychoanalyst in the technical meaning of the word. True, she claims that "the purpose of this book is not to show what is wrong with psychoanalysis, but through eliminating the debatable elements to enable psychoanalysis to develop to the height of its potentialities." Surely this is a most laudable if extraordinarily ambitious program. All serious students of psychology hope for further refinements in psychoanalytic theory, but its highest "potentialities" are not going to be developed in any single essay.

In any case, Horney pours out the baby of basic theory with the bath water of debatable elements. She repudiates or drastically revises Freud's theories of instinctual basic urges, psychosexual development, the Oedipus complex, the structure of the personality, and the repetitional patterns in life histories. Now it is exactly these theories which distinguish psychoanalysis from other modern theories of personality. She retains the idea of strict psychic determinism, the idea that actions and feelings are largely determined by the unconscious, and the theory that the emotions are the chief motor forces behind behavior. These ideas are undoubtedly sound, but no one of them was completely original with Freud. Freud's great service has been in proving their validity. In addition, these ideas are accepted by practically all modern psychopathologists and have become basic postulates of most of the deviate schools like those of Jung, Adler, and Rank. Consequently it is hard to follow Horney's assertion that her work is not "meant to be the beginning of a new psychoanalytical school." From the introduction and first two chapters it is clear that Horney is making a sharp break with psychoanalysis.

The remaining fourteen chapters cover much of the theory of psychoanalysis, each one following the same definite pattern. Horney presents the orthodox viewpoints, subjects them to sharp criticism, and ends with her own views, which, more often than not, are markedly discordant. The book turns into a fourteen-round ring battle between the "new ways" (Horney) and the "old ways" (Freud). More accurately described, it is fourteen rounds of shadow boxing because it is Horney who sets up the Freud—and not always accurately—whom she later attempts to knock down. I cannot in a brief review give a round-by-round account of this battle. As referee I would award three rounds to Horney (chapters headed Feminine Psychology, Death Instinct, and Culture and Neuroses), seven rounds to Freud's shadow, and call four rounds draws. So Freud wins the decision. In fact, Horney's discussion of therapy in the last chapter is based on such dubious arguments that one might call it a technical knock-out by Freud.

Horney's criticisms hinge in final analysis on three points: the instinctual nature of Freud's basic urges cannot be demonstrated; psychoanalysts have underestimated the role of culture in molding personality; and they have overestimated the importance of childhood development at the cost of neglecting the contemporary life situation. The first two of these points I believe to be unimportant for the systematic significance of psychoanalysis, and the third I do not believe to be valid. Whether the basic drives are instincts is of great importance for the implications of psychoanalysis for sociology but of practically none for the psychoanalytic theory of both the normal and the sick personality. Freud himself calls the

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instinct theory "our mythology" and uses it simply as a starting postulate. What follows in his theory can be demonstrated quite adequately without this bias. In recent times many analysts have realized the neglect of cultural factors in the psychoanalysis of the past. Horney herself has done notable work here. With her insistence on the importance of the present life situation I agree, but I do not think this in any way invalidates the beautiful dialectics of the theory of psychosexual genesis. This theory in itself combines cultural and psychological factors to show exactly how in our culture the child is the psychological father of the man. Change the cultural factors and, as the anthropologists have shown, you get behavioral differences, but these are not as great as the behavioral similarities which remain. Although some of Horney's individual critical points are well taken, in the final analysis the "old ways" retain their great significance and the "new ways" turn out to be rather meaningless.

That Horney's position is nearer Adler's than Freud's is most clearly indicated in her last chapter on therapy. Freud long ago pointed out that a psychoanalysis is complete only when the individual has relived the traumatic infantile experiences in the so-called transference situation. The function of the analyst is simply to guide the individual in this reliving; so that actually it is the individual who cures himself. There is good evidence—some of it based on actual experiments—that of all the therapies only a psychoanalysis of this sort changes the basic structure of the personality. Horney's "new" technique emphasizes the present life situation of the neurotic and leaves the genesis of the neurosis in the background. She does not hesitate to give up the passive role of the analyst and make active suggestions. By so doing she claims to have better results. We have known for many years that there are easier ways than psychoanalysis to help some neurotics. Suggestive psychotherapy, hypnosis, Christian Science, Couéism, and even events in real life, like inheriting a fortune or losing one, all these effect "cures." The demonstrable trouble with these cures is that they are pretty short-lived. I am afraid that many of Horney's cures with the "new" method may turn out to be short-lived, too.

J. F. BROWN

FILMS

"THE END OF A DAY," the French picture with which the excellently managed Filmarte Theater in New York (Jean Lenauer) opened its new season, deserves and will easily have the same great success as its predecessors, "La Kermesse Héroique," "Mayerling," and "The Grand Illusion." Again there is a new theme and a refreshing absence of the Hollywood formula for bringing everything at forced speed to a clear-cut ending, happy or otherwise, as life never does. Many episodes in this French picture could be eliminated without harm to the "plot," but they serve a higher purpose and are rightly elaborated with great love by the actors and the director (Duvivier). I should not like to do without any one of them. It is not true that the effect would be heightened and the picture gain by their absence. The leisure with which this story of a milieu and a group of people is told is a means of art for revealing the general world by the portrayal of a particular one. One need not be an old actor to understand the deep moral of this picture about old actors. In their exaggerations of true feelings and pretense one sees one's own ambitions and shortcomings, and one leaves the picture not only aware of having been entertained in the best fashion but even a little wiser.

The scene is an old actors' home somewhere in southern France. With the exception of a young waitress who plays a small part, the cast consists entirely of older people. There is Cabrissade, the lifelong understudy, who is always pretending and acting in life and writes his own obituary to be read at his grave. Michel Simon plays this character with such perfection that alone he provides enough excellence for one picture. But there are others; in fact, everyone in the cast is equally satisfying. Victor Francen as the too intellectual, too considerate actor who could never win public favor, Louis Jouvet as the *homme du femme* who sends himself love letters, the old couple holding hands and talking of their children and children's children till it comes to light that they

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By Harold J. Laski

MOSCOW AND THE AMERICAN LEFT
By James Wechsler

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were never married (their final wedding, with the speech of the tolerant Catholic priest, is a highlight of the picture and as mature a scene of ironical delight as one could wish)—a whole gallery of characters is presented in the framework of a casual story almost flawless in its suspense and beauty. Julien Duvivier, who with Charles Spaak wrote the script, directed the picture with the eyes of a poet who lets the camera serve his vision. He achieves complete unity. No wonder he left Hollywood because he did not want to be constantly interfered with by producers with set commercial formulas. One has only to compare the nightmare he was forced to concoct in Hollywood last year, "The Great Waltz," with this outstanding work to agree that he has proved his point.

FRANZ HOELLERING

RECORDS

SOME people have told me that when part of Wagner's "Ring" was broadcast from Bayreuth recently they found it unendurable. They were people who had had ears only for the impressive sound of the music at a time when other listeners, aware of what the extraordinary musical resources were being employed to express, not only had found the grandiose philosophical conceptions absurdly infantile and muddled, but had feared the minds which such conceptions impressed. And during the recent crisis the people I first mentioned were suddenly aware of the sense in the sound—a sense which had the menace of the minds it had influenced, the events it had helped to produce.

For those who still can listen to Act II of "Die Walküre" I will report that the new Victor set (ten records, $20) offers the music excellently recorded by Lotte Lehmann, Lauritz Melchior, and less familiar but good singers, the Berlin State Opera Orchestra under Seidler-Winkler, and the former Vienna Philharmonic under Bruno Walter. There is almost none of the reverberation that was so noticeable in the recording of Act I; but in my review pressing there are occasional faulty surfaces.

Whereas Koussevitzky's old set gave only excerpts from Stravinsky's "Petrouchka," Stokowski's new one (four records, $8) gives the entire work, and with tonal splendor that is recorded with present-day spaciousness, richness, and fidelity to timbre, but also with a nervous excitement that is alien and disadvantageous to the work. Thus, Stokowski rushes through the beginning of the fourth scene as he does through the Bacchanale from "Tannhäuser"; but whereas the submerging of detail in the flood of sound is a gain in the Bacchanale it is a loss in "Petrouchka"; and there is a loss also through Stokowski's impatience in the pauses and silences that Stravinsky prescribes.

Elgar's expertly contrived, least rhetorical, and most enjoyable work, his "Enigma Variations," has been recorded by the B. B. C. Symphony under Boult (three records, $5). The performance lacks the sensitive warmth that Harty puts into the work in an older Columbia recording, which does not sound shabby by the side of the new Victor.

On a single record ($1.50) Lotte Lehmann imparts a characteristic emotional warmth to Beethoven's exquisite "Ich liebe dich," where Flagstad's sensitive phrasing achieves an effect of quiet intimacy. Paul Robeson is enjoyable in a Negro folk-song "No More," but shows little taste in his choice of Lily Strickland's "Jes Mah Song" for the reverse side of the record (75 cents). And I find the singing of the Siberian Singers a little too tricky in the folk-songs "In the Village" and "Beneath the Snow My Russia Lies" ($1). The Scarlatti-Taussig "Pastorale" and "Capriccio" and Beethoven's "Rage Over the Lost Penny" are well recorded by Brailovsky ($2).

A few *New Music Quarterly* recordings made by Musicraft and distributed by Bennington College Cooperative Store have accumulated on my shelf: six songs by Charles Ives (1412); Edgar Varèse's "Octandre" (1411); Edwin Gerschefski's New Music for piano and Gerald Strang's Sonatina for clarinet (1312); Paul Creston's Suite for saxophone and piano (1313); Harrison Kerr's Study for unaccompanied 'cello, Robert McBride's "Warm-up" for English horn, and his "Let-down" for English horn and piano (1314). Creston's suite is mildly engaging; but I have not been able to discover anything in the other works to explain why anyone should have written them and have thought anyone else should listen to them.

The good jazz records reissued by Victor under Panassié's sponsorship—to say nothing, for the moment, of the poor ones—include Charlie Johnson's "The Boy in the Boat" (Bluebird), with Jimmy Harrison on trombone and Sidney De Paris on trumpet; Fletcher Henderson's "Hocus Pocus" (Bluebird), with Buster Bailey on clarinet and Coleman Hawkins on tenor saxophone; the McKinney Cotton Pickers' "Gee, Ain't I Good to You" (Bluebird), with Joe Smith and De Paris on trumpet (it is, I believe, De Paris who has the melody in the first chorus, not, as Panassié thinks, Smith); and "Fats" Waller's "You're Not the Only Oyster in the Stew" and "Dream Man" (Bluebird), the second with Bill Coleman on trumpet and Eugene Sedric on clarinet. Waller's recent "Honey Hush" and "I Used to Love You" (Bluebird) are good of their kind; and I have liked the Bud Freeman "I've Found a New Baby" and "Easy to Get" (Bluebird), the Benny Carter "Blue Light Blues" (Victor), and Earl Hines's "Piano Man" (Bluebird), which gives an impressive demonstration of his rhythmically intricate style. The boogie-woogie pianists leave me cold; but I can hear that Pete Johnson's performances for a new company called Solo Art (1600 Broadway) are among the best of their kind. And General Records (also 1600 Broadway) has issued a twelve-inch record of the "Pins and Needles" company in their "Red Mikado" scene.

B. H. HAGGIN

Next Week in The Nation

AUTUMN MISCELLANY—SEVEN POEMS

By Wallace Stevens, W. H. Auden, John Peale Bishop, and Others

Selected by John Berryman

This is the first of a series of collections of contemporary verse edited by Mr. Berryman which will appear at regular intervals in *The Nation*

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Letters to the Editors

Antediluvian Liberalism

Dear Sirs: The Letter to "All Active Supporters of Democracy and Peace" brought to my mind an antediluvian article in the *Yale Review*, spring, 1938, The French Bourgeoisie and Communism. The "enlightened liberal bourgeoisie" (Blum, Herriot, etc.) has been defeated but not destroyed.

> Between fascism and even the extreme forms of communism the enlightened liberal bourgeoisie in France does not hesitate. The obvious evils are the same on both sides: a ruthless dictatorship prevails in Russia as well as in Germany. The advantages are the same on both sides: petty squabbles are silenced, collective pride and enthusiasm are fostered, material efficiency, in certain fields, is increased in a spectacular way. Russia is still immeasurably behind Germany in economic development, but Russia has progressed far more in this respect under the Bolshevists than Germany under the Nazis. Both systems are brands of socialism, in the broad sense, and the individualist may reject them both, deeming the spiritual price too heavy for the material advantages. But between Nazism and Bolshevism there are radical differences. For the Bolshevist, party dictatorship is said to be a war measure, purely temporary; for the Nazi, personal dictatorship, *Führertum*, is announced as the final stage.
>
> Then, too, communism, like Christianity, is international and interracial. It recognizes, in theory if not in practice, both the essential unity and the infinite variety of mankind. It fosters local cultures, and does not seek to impose the supremacy of any ethnic group. Fascism is founded upon national exclusiveness and racial pride, and these are the causes of eternal war between states. . . .

Whatever may be the wobbling policies of individual men and small party groups, I still believe these radical differences hold good.

ALBERT GUÉRARD

Stanford University, Cal., September 13

If America Intervenes

Dear Sirs: It would be indeed impertinent for a foreigner (a British Indian) to advise the American people on what attitude they should adopt toward the European conflict. But suppose American intervention in any form did take place; it is unthinkable that it could be a pure and simple intervention without any conditions laid down beforehand. What should be those terms? Among others I would suggest these:

1. Removal of British troops from northern Ireland; a free, unified, and independent Ireland.
2. A free, autonomous India and Burma.
3. A federation of free Arab states, with facilities for Jewish immigration throughout the federation and not exclusively into Palestine.
4. Internationalization of the African colonies, with Americans participating in the civil and military administration. Facilities for emigration of American Negroes to such colonies, for they of all peoples are best fitted to guide their African cousins to a progressive life.

Rejection of such terms would, of course, mean refusal to intervene.

RABINDRA MOHON MAITZA

Paris, September 10

Overheard in Moscow

Dear Sirs: Your readers may be interested in a few first-hand observations on the reaction of the Russian people to the German pact. The populace received the news calmly and, in many cases, even with enthusiasm. In the subway and in the buses and street cars one heard remarks like "That's fine—the Germans are no worse than the British, and we don't want a war." Recent articles in the Soviet press have attacked Britain or rather the present British government in no ambiguous terms as being dishonest and demagogical, not only with Moscow, but with its own Parliament. The year-long Russian propaganda against the Nazis has not gone deep enough with the population to preclude amicable relations with Germany practically on a moment's notice.

A typically sane position seems to me to be that of a friend of mine, a history teacher in Moscow, not a party member, just a simple, honest, and intelligent Soviet citizen. "We want peace," she said, "that is the most important thing. It looked for a while as though the main menace to peace was German fascism, which openly talked about attacking us and taking the Ukraine. We talked with the English and French until we found that they were double-crossing us whenever they felt they could, and were, in a sense, almost ready to perpetrate a war in order to maintain their empires and their position of world domination. So now we'll talk to both sides, and maybe we will be able to stall off a war altogether."

In my opinion, one can go even farther than the history teacher, and point out that Russia is inheriting Britain's old position in Europe. Russia is now the most powerful single country on the continent, and has the prerequisites for playing the same game that Britain used to play—never commit itself, talk with both sides, and maintain a balance of power. There is one necessary element which the Soviet Union has been thought to lack—that is, a competent set of diplomats and statesmen, capable of holding their own against the long experience of the British and the French. Now it seems that in spite of the trials and the removal of Maxim Litvinov, there are several people in the Kremlin who have been making very sharp analyses of the situation and have learned how to utilize their own assets and find the weak points in the enemy's armor. If Molotov continues to be as astute as he has been since he took over the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Union can now start a period of balancing and juggling in Europe while expanding and strengthening its own internal industrial and political organization.

JOHN STEVENS

Moscow, August 24

Paine's Words Still Valid

Dear Sirs: I do not know of any words more pertinent to the present situation than these of Thomas Paine:

> If there is a sin superior to every other, it is that of wilful and offensive war. Most other sins are circumscribed within narrow limits, that is, the power of one man cannot give them a very general extension, and many kinds of sins have only a mental existence from which no infection arises; but he who is the author of a war lets loose the whole contagion of hell, and opens a vein that bleeds a nation to death.

Above the entrance of a very large industrial establishment appears the words "World Peace Through World Trade." Thomas Paine expressed this in slightly different form when he said:

> War can never be the interest of a trading nation any more than quareling can be

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profitable to a man in business. To make war with those who trade with us is like setting a bulldog upon a customer at the shopdoor.

The author of "The Rights of Man" knew that the medieval types of government, whether monarchies or dictatorships, which existed in some countries of Europe would rob and enslave the people and continually plunge them into war. That is why he strove so hard to bring about a more equitable representation for the people in governmental matters. If the principles of government and the philosophy of life laid down by him were established by the governments of Europe, they would prevent the rise of a maniac like Hitler and insure a firm foundation for a lasting peace among the peoples of the earth. Paine said:

> An army of principles will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot; it will succeed where diplomatic management would fail; it is neither the Rhine, the Channel, nor the Ocean that can arrest its progress: it will march on the horizon of the world and it will conquer.

JOSEPH LEWIS

Purdys, N. Y., September 11

Dewey Research Fellowship

Dear Sirs: Professor Sidney Hook has announced a contest for the first award of a $750 fellowship for a piece of original research work on a labor problem or a constructive analysis of such a problem. The judges will be Professors John Dewey and Sidney Hook, and Julius Hochman, well-known labor leader. The name of the winner will be made public, and the chosen manuscript will be published by the John Dewey Research Fellowship, of which Professor Hook is chairman.

The fellowship was founded by friends and admirers of Professor Dewey in honor of his approaching eightieth birthday, in appreciation of his contributions to the labor movement and to human progress, and in the hope of stimulating wide interest in the labor movement. The contest is open to everyone under the following rules:

1. A full, detailed outline of a proposed manuscript, the latter to be preferably of book size, must be submitted on or before November 30, 1939.

2. The outline is to be signed with a nom de plume. The real name and address of the contestant should be placed in an attached sealed envelope, with the nom de plume on the outside.

3. The manuscript must be completed within one year after date of award.

4. One-third of the fellowship ($250) will be presented to the winning contestant on acceptance of the outline, the balance ($500) on acceptance by the judges of the completed manuscript.

Outlines should be mailed to me at the College of the City of New York, 17 Lexington Avenue, New York.

HILLMAN M. BISHOP,
Secretary of the Committee of Award

New York, September 12

Citizenship for Dr. Kang

Dear Sirs: We would like to call to the attention of *Nation* readers the position of one of America's prominent authors and scholars, Dr. Younghill Kang. Dr. Kang, a graduate of Harvard University, is at present serving as a professor of English at New York University and as a staff member of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. He was formerly a member of the editorial staff of the Encyclopedia Britannica and was twice given the Guggenheim Foundation award in creative literature. He is the author of two well-known books, "The Grass Roof" and "East Goes West." Both his accomplishments and his cultural abilities identify him intimately with the American scene.

Dr. Kang, however, is not a citizen of the United States and cannot become a citizen under our present naturalization laws because of his race. He was born in Korea, but has been a legal resident of the United States for the past eighteen years. His wife and two children are American-born citizens.

The American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born strongly feels that Dr. Kang should be an American citizen. Two bills in his behalf have been introduced in the Seventy-sixth Congress by Representative Kent E. Keller, of Illinois, and Senator Matthew M. Neely, of West Virginia. If these bills are passed by Congress, Dr. Kang can fulfil a lifelong ambition and become an American citizen.

We wish that readers of *The Nation* would write to their Congressmen asking them to support the bills that will enable Dr. Younghill Kang to become an American citizen. We want to appeal also for financial support for our campaign. Contributions may be sent to the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, 79 Fifth Avenue, New York.

HERMAN F. REISSIG,
Chairman, American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born

New York, September 15

CONTRIBUTORS

LOUIS FISCHER, who has served as *The Nation's* correspondent in Russia and Spain, is now sending us from Paris frequent first-hand reports on the European war.

KENNETH G. CRAWFORD, Washington correspondent of the New York *Post,* is the author of a book on lobbying called "The Pressure Boys," which will appear in a few weeks.

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CONSTANCE ROURKE is the author of a number of books dealing with American social and cultural history, including "Audubon," "Trumpets of Jubilee," and "American Humor."

J. F. BROWN is the author of "Psychology and the Social Order."

Correction: In the article Reclaiming the Dust Bowl, which appeared in our issue of September 9, Kunigunde Duncan wrote: "Aided by WPA and federal subsidy the Dust Bowl people have planted 50,000,000 seedling trees and are to plant millions more." Through a misprint the figure appeared as 50,000. —EDITORS THE NATION.

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